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ABSTRACT 
 
Upriver to Hue and Dong Ha:  The U.S. Navy’s War in I Corps, Vietnam, 1967-1970. 
(December 2011) 
Jonathan Blackshear Chavanne, B.A., Baylor University;  
M.A., American Military University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. James Bradford 
 
 The United States Navy’s involvement in the Vietnam War, especially its role in 
the region’s inland waterways, has long been an overshadowed aspect of the conflict.  
Most histories ignore or minimize the Navy’s contribution, especially its river patrol or 
‘brown water’ role.  Through archival and library research as well as interviews with 
U.S Navy Vietnam War veterans this thesis demonstrates the vital role played by the 
brown water navy in the northern provinces of South Vietnam.  A key but understudied 
component of this effort was Task Force Clearwater, an improvised brown water fleet 
that—along with the maritime logistics campaign that it supported—would prove 
essential for the successful defense of South Vietnam’s northernmost provinces and 
demonstrate the vital importance of inland naval power.   
 Task Force Clearwater and its supported maritime logistics effort form a little 
explored component of the U.S. Navy’s role in South Vietnam.  A brown water task 
force that proved essential for the successful defense of the northern provinces of I 
Corps, Clearwater repeatedly demonstrated the vital importance of inland naval power 
and the critical need for reliable and protected routes of supply.  The task force revealed 
iv 
 
many lessons that had been long understood, forgotten, and then relearned by the U.S. 
Navy, among them that control of inland waterways was perhaps the most advantageous 
form of logistical supply in war.  Created in part to satisfy the ancient maxim of 
“keeping the supply lines open”, the task force’s role broadened with time.  In the course 
of its existence the men and boats of Clearwater would provide not only the tools of war 
in I Corps but also provide key lessons for the future.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: ORIGINS OF THE VIETNAM BROWN WATER NAVY 
“It was a slow, dirty, sand-bar kind of war.” 
             - LT John C. Roberts, USN 1965 
 
 On the hot and sweltering morning of July 1st, 1970 a brief turnover ceremony 
took place at a small and isolated U.S. Navy base in South Vietnam.  As part of the new 
policy of Vietnamization, a term coined by President Richard Nixon, US forces were 
turning over responsibilities to their South Vietnamese counterparts.  Naval Support 
Activity Tan My, a short distance to the south of the Demilitarized Zone, witnessed the 
official stand down of a small but vital component of the US Navy’s combat role in the 
Vietnam War.  The ceremony marked the official disestablishment of Task Force 
Clearwater, a river patrol force that since its inception in February 1968 had been the US 
Navy’s primary inland presence in the 1st Corps Tactical Zone, the northernmost of the 
four zones that comprised South Vietnam.  In a farewell message Vice Admiral Jerome 
King, the Commander US Naval Forces Vietnam (COMNAVFORV) congratulated Task 
Force Clearwater’s officers and men on the completion of their twenty-nine month 
mission.  Exhorting them to take pride in their accomplishments, he ended by noting that 
they had trained their South Vietnamese counterparts to the degree that they “are now 
capable of taking over TF Clearwater’s combat responsibilities.”1     
 This message conveyed not only the hopes of Admiral King but also those of the 
Nixon administration and the US Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) that 
                                                
This thesis follows the style of Chicago Manual of Style. 1	  Clearwater Task Force Operations Summary 270413Z JUN 1970.	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the armed forces of South Vietnam, armed to the teeth with American weaponry and 
supplies, would be able to defend their beleaguered country.  Under the innovative and 
energetic leadership of Vice Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, who held the post of 
COMNAVFORV from late 1968 to early 1970, the diverse array of US Navy forces in 
South Vietnam had begun to train the South Vietnamese Navy (VNN) for this purpose.  
Following the January 1973 Paris Agreements the last remaining American military 
personnel left South Vietnam, many believing that the country could survive. In an April 
1973 letter penned by the last COMNAVFORV, Rear Admiral James Wilson, to the 
Commander of the Pacific Fleet, the admiral was optimistic regarding the South 
Vietnamese level of training and preparation. He concluded that an, “appraisal of the 
VNN and VNMC (Vietnamese Marine Corps) find that both services are capable of 
successfully meeting the demands that are likely to be placed upon them in the 
immediate and near term future.”2   
 This effort failed.  Despite the earnest hopes of millions and vast expenditures in 
money, material, and blood, the shattered remnants of an independent South Vietnam 
were crushed on April 30th, 1975. When deprived of direct American support, the U.S. 
trained military of South Vietnam could simply not withstand the undying determination 
of the communists to unify their country under the banner of “revolutionary war.”  A 
creation of the West that knew few moments of peace since its creation, the Republic of 
South Vietnam passed into history overnight. For the United States, the war ended in an 
American defeat one US general and later historian declared as, “unprecedented in the 
                                                2	  As quoted in Thomas J. Cutler, Brown Water, Black Berets:  Coastal and Riverine 
Warfare in Vietnam (Annapolis, MD:  Naval Institute Press), 356.	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annals of military history,” and remains one of the America’s most bitter and enduring 
memories.3    
 Even before the fall of Saigon historians had expended copious amounts of time 
and energy analyzing America’s failure in Southeast Asia.  A vast array of scholarship 
has also been directed towards the combat histories of the US Army and Marine Corps in 
Vietnam, with the battles of Ia Drang and Khe Sanh far better known than a decade ago.  
The destructive yet inconclusive ‘Rolling Thunder’ and Linebacker’ Operations that 
have come to symbolize the Air Force’s combat history in Vietnam have also received 
considerable scholarship.  At the bottom of scholars’ priorities has been the role of the 
US Navy, obfuscated by the combination of America’s eventual defeat and its 
amorphous and ill-defined role in Southeast Asia. 
 Historical memory recalls a long and frustrating naval conflict.  The war 
witnessed 2,511 sailors killed and over 10,000 wounded, as well as hundreds of aircraft, 
boats and river craft consumed both during the war and after the collapse of South 
Vietnam.  Among many others it fell to a naval aviator, Lieutenant John McCain, to 
symbolize the privation and determination exhibited by American prisoners of war.  
These facts only tell a fraction of the story, however.  In an essay summarizing the 
Navy’s experience during the Vietnam conflict, naval historian Edward Marolda 
contends that that the prevailing view of a long and futile struggle obscures the war’s 
ultimate impact on the service.  Arguing against the traditional consensus he concluded 
that, “The Navy, however, emerged from that searing experience with a better 
                                                
3 Phillip B. Davidson, Vietnam at War:  The History 1946-1975 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988), ix.  
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understanding of the nature of the conflict in the post-World War II era.  In the 
operational realm, after a decade of warfare the naval service had honed a sharp-edged 
sword for projecting power ashore with carrier, naval gunfire, and amphibious forces; 
learned optimum approaches to seizing and maintaining control of open seas, coastal 
waters, and inland waterways.”4  
 In some ways American involvement in South Vietnam began and ended with 
the Navy, as the service was the key player in two pivotal events that bookended the 
conflict.  The controversial August 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Incident involving the USS 
Maddox and USS Turner Joy became one of the catalysts for expanded 
“Americanization.”  After the U.S. military endured fourteen years of war and nearly 
sixty thousand American casualties, the Navy spearheaded Operation Frequent Wind, 
the air and naval evacuation of over seven thousand military and civilian personnel in 
April 1975.  The operation symbolized for many the perceived catastrophe of American 
involvement.  The naval war in the years between these two events, however, has long 
been seen as a sideshow to the far more important battles on land and in the skies.   
 A few reasons for this trend are obvious.  The American military role in Vietnam 
seems to offer little in the way of memorable naval campaigns, and in terms of sheer 
numbers, less than forty thousand officers and men, the Navy did not dominate as it had 
in past wars in the Pacific.5  Geography and politics limited the role the Navy could play, 
and many of the best general histories of the war barely mention its involvement.  For 
                                                4	  Edward J. Marolda, “Crucible of War:  The U.S. Navy and the Vietnam Experience,” 
Elmo Zumwalt Collection, Texas Tech Vietnam Archive, 2. 5 Richard Schreadley, “The Naval War in Vietnam, 1950-1970,” US Naval Institute 
Proceedings, 96:8 (August 1970), 23.	  
5 
 
many sailors, however, the war was both memorable and relevant, and provided repeated 
opportunities for all of war’s traditional privation and glory.  Beyond blue water support 
in the form of carrier air strikes and a sea blockade the naval war in Vietnam was at its 
heart a river war.  This was a gritty, brutal conflict marked by long periods of dull watch 
standing punctuated by intense firefights at close quarters, and in many ways would 
prove among the Navy’s most challenging in its history.   
 The obstacles in South Vietnam proved daunting.  A new brown water river force 
had to be built from the keel up, relying on tactics and methods that had lain dormant for 
decades.  A key but understudied component of this effort was Task Force Clearwater, 
an improvised brown water fleet that—along with the maritime logistics campaign that it 
supported—would prove essential for the successful defense of South Vietnam’s 
northernmost provinces and demonstrate the vital importance of inland naval power.   
Beyond its important logistical role in some of the war’s fiercest campaigns, the 
task force revealed what had long been understood, forgotten, and then relearned by the 
U.S. Navy, that whatever state controlled the inland waterways could exert power on 
land.  Created in part to satisfy the ancient maxim of “keeping the supply lines open” the 
task force’s role broadened over time.  In the course of its existence the men and boats of 
Clearwater would provide not only the tools of war to those fighting on land but would 
also demonstrate considerable adaptability, courage, and the ability to provide key 
lessons for the future. 
 The U.S. Navy was no stranger to river warfare, having been involved in 
extensive brown water operations in the Mexican-American War, the U.S. Civil War, 
and on the long rivers of Asia a century before its involvement in Vietnam.  As part of 
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the Asiatic Fleet in China from 1866 to 1942, the US Navy conducted river presence and 
peacekeeping patrols along the Yangtze River,6 a mission later immortalized by Richard 
McKennna in his novel The Sand Pebbles.7  Despite its extensive experience in brown 
water operations various constraints had limited its utility in overall US Navy strategy.  
In his history of brown water operations naval historian Blake Dunnavent concluded that 
while the U.S. Navy was the beneficiary of nearly two centuries of riverine warfare, 
from 1775 to 1970 the service relied on “informal doctrine” and never addressed the 
challenging need to create a more institutionalized operational guidelines for the conduct 
of ‘brown water’ warfare.   
 This informal doctrine could be likened to a set of vague instructions only 
opened in an emergency and then quickly forgotten.  As the U.S. military became 
steadily more consumed by events in Southeast Asia the Navy had to reconstitute its 
brown water navy from this informal doctrine. Unlike previous wars, however, 
Dunnavent concluded that Vietnam was different, and this time a formal and codified 
canon of brown water strategy began to emerge, noting, “Events in the conflict in 
Southeast Asia marked a turning point in the emergence of a formalized riverine warfare 
tactical doctrine for the U.S. Navy.”8  
 
                                                6	  R. Blake Dunnavent. Brown Water Warfare:  The U.S. Navy in Riverine Warfare and 
the Emergence of a Tactical Doctrine, 1775-1970 (Gainesville, FL:  University of 
Florida Press, 2003), 103-104.  See also Kemp Tolley, Yangtze Patrol: The U.S. Navy in 
China (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1971); Bernard D. Cole, Gunboats and 
Marines: The United States Navy in China, 1945-1928 (Newark:  University of 
Delaware Press, 1983); William R. Braisted, Diplomats in Blue: U.S. Naval Officers in 
China, 1922-33 (Gainesville:  University Press of Florida, 2009). 7 Richard McKenna, The Sand Pebbles. (New York:  Harper and Row, 1962). 8 Dunnavent, Brown Water Warfare, 110.	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Bucklew and Vung Ro  
          Much like the overall US military’s effort in the Vietnam War, the establishment 
of Task Force Clearwater was an incremental process.  From 1960 to 1964 the US 
Navy’s mission in South Vietnam was in an advisory role, training the poorly equipped 
but expanding South Vietnamese Navy (VNN).  Despite the desire by President John F. 
Kennedy to leave as small a footprint as possible, during this period the ties and 
organization between the US military and the South Vietnamese grew stronger with each 
passing year. With American leadership and material support the VNN expanded from 
around 3,000 personnel in June 1961 to 6,000 less than two years later.9   
 The U.S. military’s primary command and control structure in South Vietnam, 
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), which would later come to embody 
South Vietnam’s expanding American military presence, was established in February 
1962.  The US Navy’s presence in country remained small, however, and at the end of 
1963 fewer than eight hundred American naval officers and men were in stationed in 
country.10  In 1964 a pair of events that many historians forever associate with American 
entry into the larger war occurred, but while on the strategic level the Gulf of Tonkin 
incident in August 1964 and the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong attack on Pleiku the 
following February have received the lion’s share of scholarly attention, two less 
remembered events were far more influential in the development of a coherent maritime 
strategy in Southeast Asia. 
                                                9	  Edward J. Marolda, From Military Assistance to Combat, 1959-1965, vol. 2 of The 
United States Navy and the Vietnam Conflict (Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, 
1984), 224.   10 Richard L. Schreadley, “The Naval War in Vietnam, 1950-1970,” in Vietnam:  The 
Naval Story, ed. by Frank Uhlig (Annapolis, MD:  Naval Institute Press, 1986), 279. 
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 The first was the influential Bucklew Report. In January 1964 the head of the US 
Navy’s Pacific Fleet, Admiral Harry Felt sent a fact-finding team headed by Captain 
Phillip Bucklew to South Vietnam.  By this time infiltration of communist men and 
supplies into South Vietnam had become an acute and worsening problem, with more 
modern Chinese and Soviet weapons finding their way into the hands of Viet Cong and 
National Liberation Front cadres.  A demanding taskmaster, Felt had grown weary of the 
optimistic reports then being generated and gave Bucklew simple instructions: get me 
the facts and get them fast.  Felt wanted an honest assessment of not only the infiltration 
problem but also the overall military situation in South Vietnam.11 
 The full report was released a month later.  The primary conclusions reinforced 
previous MACV and CINCPAC assessments that the main logistics route for the 
communists was through Laos on the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and that maritime infiltration 
was a secondary means for moving personnel and logistics to the enormous Mekong 
Delta where they were distributed throughout South Vietnam.12 The report expressed 
deep pessimism about the ability of the South Vietnamese to stop the growing 
infiltration on land or sea and concluded that the communists could move men and 
materiel with ease.  Perhaps most importantly, the report concluded that any sea 
blockade was useless if the accompanying inland infiltration routes were not blocked as 
well.13  Among the report’s recommendations were the strengthening of the coastal 
patrols, better enforcement of curfews among all inland waterways and increased 
                                                11 David Lane Jones, “U.S. Riverine Warfare in Vietnam:  A Critical Analysis of 
Strategy.” PhD Dissertation (Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1999), 69. 12 Ibid., 70.	  13	  Schreadley, “The Naval War in Vietnam, 1950-1970,” 23.   
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involvement of US Navy assets in the region.  Only one of the more peripheral 
recommendations, the inclusion of a representative of the VNN on the Joint General 
Staff, was accomplished quickly.  Most of the report’s other recommendations were not 
acted upon, despite the growing evidence of increased seaborne infiltration.  For the 
remainder of 1964 little effort was made to alter American naval strategy.14  
 The second major event did much to change this policy.  On February 16th 1965 a 
US Army UH-1 “Huey” helicopter pilot flying on a rescue mission off the coast of 
central South Vietnam noticed a camouflaged ship under power in Vung Ro Bay, an 
isolated indentation south of Qui Non.  After the pilot communicated the vessel’s 
description and location the local South Vietnamese coastal commander ordered it 
destroyed. A series of airstrikes disabled and all but sank the ship later identified as a 
trawler, but far more troublesome was the cache of weapons and equipment sighted 
onshore.  A series of inept attempts by the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) and VNN 
to assault the site ensued, and it was not until February 24th and after overcoming heavy 
Viet Cong resistance that they secured the site.15  To considerable consternation it was 
discovered that the offloaded cargo included over one hundred tons of Russian and 
Chinese made weaponry, ammunition, and medical supplies.  Evidence from the ship 
proved its origin was in North Vietnam.  After more than a year of downplaying 
seaborne infiltration the issue was no longer debatable for the US Navy. Vung Ro 
                                                14 Jones, “U.S. Riverine Warfare in Vietnam,” 72-73. 15 Schreadley, “The Naval War in Vietnam, 1950-1970,” 281. 
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stunned many senior American naval officers, one of which remarked plainly that after 
more than a year of denial, “Sea infiltration into RVN is now proved.”16      
 In his history of the brown water navy in Vietnam, Thomas Cutler, a veteran of 
the force, argues that the importance of this event cannot be overestimated.  “The Vung 
Ro Incident had done more than prove that North Vietnam was infiltrating supplies by 
sea: it cast serious doubt about the capability of the South Vietnamese to counter the 
infiltration.”  Most importantly, Cutler contended, the “Vung Ro Incident had sparked a 
feeling of urgency” and ushered in a new era for the US Navy in Vietnam.17  The 
incident led to a chain of events that culminated in the creation of Task Force Clearwater 
three years later. 
 Even before the end of the Vung Ro Incident the most senior officer in South 
Vietnam, Commander US Military Assistance Command Vietnam (COMUSMACV) 
General William Westmoreland undertook steps to address the infiltration problem.  
MACV organized a conference on the infiltration issue and on March 3rd Westmoreland 
met with naval officers and planners from CINCPAC.  All agreed that a more robust and 
proactive naval effort should be undertaken, and armed with several of the Bucklew 
Report’s recommendations the conference formulated a plan to create a naval blockade 
force to “stop, board, search, and if necessary, capture and/or destroy any hostile 
suspicious craft or vessel found within South Vietnam’s territorial and contiguous zone 
waters.”18  Known as Operation Market Time this surveillance blockade was soon 
established to stem the seaborne infiltration into the south.  By April the new Task Force 
                                                16 Marolda, The United States Navy and the Vietnam Conflict, 514. 17 Cutler, Brown Water, Black Berets, 79. 18 Schreadley, “The Naval War in Vietnam, 1950-1970,” 283. 
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115 numbered twenty-eight US Navy vessels patrolling the waters off South Vietnam, 
and over the next few months its organization and resources increased substantially.19    
 The importance of Market Time’s establishment has often been obscured by 
another simultaneous and historic event.  On the morning of March 8th, 1965 a US Navy 
amphibious task force landed the 3rd Battalion, 9th Marines on Red Beach near Danang 
in I Corps.20  In September naval officers from CINCPAC, MACV, and several other 
commands met again in Saigon to discuss the progress of Market Time.  Beyond an 
evaluation of the task force, the conference recommended the creation of a Mekong 
Delta patrol force numbering over one hundred boats.  Assigned the title Task Force 116 
and code named Game Warden, this force was established in December 1965. In many 
ways the father of Task Force Clearwater, Game Warden would for the first time place 
Navy men and boats deep within the rivers of the South Vietnam.21 After more than four 
decades removed from such a mission, the US Navy would return to river patrol.    
  
“More Different Types of Boats Than You Can Imagine” 
 As the Navy prepared to implement Operation Game Warden one question 
became obvious: where were the river craft?  There were none commissioned in the U.S. 
Navy in 1965.  A River Patrol Craft (RPC) under development at the time was 
considered a failure due to its small size, limited armament, and unpopularity with 
                                                19 Cutler, Brown Water, Black Berets, 79. 20 Marolda, The United States Navy and the Vietnam Conflict, 514. 21 Schreadley, “The Naval War in Vietnam, 1950-1970,” 287-88. 
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crews.  Only thirty-four were built before the project was cancelled.22  The US Navy’s 
Bureau of Ships (BuShips) moved with remarkable speed and effectiveness, however, to 
find a suitable vessel and within a year of the establishment of Game Warden the brown 
water navy had so many different river craft that it prompted Rear Admiral Kenneth 
Veth, COMNAVFORV from April 1967 to September 1968, to note in a postwar 
interview that, “We had more different types of boats than you can imagine.”23 
 One of these boats would in time come to symbolize the brown water navy in 
Vietnam.  The iconic Patrol Boat, River (PBR) was almost a miracle of expediency (see 
Figure 1).  An urgent request of the September 1965 Saigon meeting for a new 
generation patrol boat, the requirement called for a modest sized river craft capable of 25 
knots but drawing less than eighteen inches of water.  By good fortune BuShips had 
already been in talks with Hatteras Yacht Company of North Carolina, a civilian 
company whose inventory included a 28-foot fiberglass hulled cruiser with diesel 
engines and pump-jet propulsion system. Maneuverable, fast, and seaworthy the boat 
completed a set of sea trials and on November 29th 1965 BuShips awarded United 
Boatbuilders a contract for one hundred twenty boats based on Hatteras’ design.24  Thus 
was born the Mark I PBR.  Lengthened to thirty-one feet and outfitted with ceramic 
armor and .50 caliber machine guns fore and aft, the PBR’s fiberglass hull proved 
                                                22 Norman Friedman, U.S. Small Combatants Including PT-Boats, Subchasers, and the 
Brown-Water Navy: An Illustrated Design History (Annapolis, MD:  Naval Institute 
Press, 1987), 289. 23 Admiral Kenneth Veth, Oral Interview, Texas Tech University Vietnam Archive, 
1980. 24 Friedman, U.S. Small Combatants, 312. 
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ideally suited to the heat, humidity and shallow waters of Southeast Asia.25  With 
obvious affection, one brown water sailor described the beloved boat as, “Born in an 
atmosphere of urgency and tested under actual combat conditions, the PBR could have 
been a disaster.  Instead it proved to be a fierce little combatant that accomplished its 
mission.”26 
 
Figure 1. Mark II PBR (Patrol Boat, River). Source:  Norman Friedman, U.S. Small 
Combatants Including PT-Boats, Subchasers, and the Brown-Water Navy: An Illustrated 
Design History, 320.   
 
 Cherished by brown water bluejackets for their speed, reliability and firepower, 
the PBRs become an icon of the US Navy’s presence in South Vietnam’s inland 
waterways.  As the boats began to arrive in country they were divided into river 
divisions (RivDiv) and began patrolling the main branches of the Mekong Delta.  
Further reorganization of US Naval forces in the region soon followed.  Befitting the 
                                                25 S. A. Swartztrauber, “River Patrol Relearned,” US Navy Institute Proceedings 96:5 
(May 1970), 134. 26 Cutler, Brown Water, Black Berets, 158.  
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Navy’s expanding role, Task Force 115 (Market Time) and 116 (Game Warden) along 
with numerous smaller commands were consolidated into a single command, US Naval 
Forces Vietnam.  Headquartered in Saigon, Rear Admiral Norvell Ward assumed the 
title of COMNAVFORV on April 1st, 1966.27   
 In the months that followed MACV discerned the need for an additional task 
force, one that could project sustained naval power inland and provide firepower 
sufficient for Westmoreland’s strategy of ‘search and destroy’ missions.  A ‘riverine’ 
task force, defined by its ability to use “water transport to move military equipment,” i.e. 
men and supplies, into a river environment would be required.28  Late in 1966 naval 
strategist Anthony Harrigan foresaw the need to employ such a riverine force in 
Vietnam.  In a key essay he advocated a heavily armed river flotilla composed of three 
kinds of craft:  a fast patrol boat for scouting and interdiction operations, a larger, more 
heavily armed support craft, and a throwback “monitor,” a boat with armor and 
armament sufficient to modern counterinsurgency operations.29  Such a force began its 
operational existence in September 1966 as River Assault Flotilla One, and in June 1967 
was officially established as Task Force 117, the Mobile Riverine Force (MRF).          
 The MRF was a curious mix of old and new boats, reinvented tactics, and hybrid 
crews.  Composed of modified troop transports and gunboats, the most common was the 
sixty foot Armored Troop Carrier (ATC), a modified version of the 1950’s Landing 
Craft, Medium (LCM-6) amphibious assault craft, each of which could carry a full 
                                                27 Schreadley, “The Naval War in Vietnam, 1950-1970,” 287. 28 John W. Baker, Lee Dickson, “Army Forces in Riverine Operations,” Military Review 
42, no. 3 (August 1967): 942-46. 29 Anthony Harrigan, “Inshore and River Warfare,” Orbis 10, no. 3 (Fall 1966), 942-46. 
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platoon of combat troops (see Figure 2).30  One petty officer described them as “an LCM 
that was converted, heavily converted, to an ironclad war type boat.”31  The second craft 
was the Civil War inspired monitor envisioned by Harrigan.  Also a converted LCM the 
monitor provided impressive firepower and protection, being equipped with heavy 
armor, a large mortar, 40 and 20mm cannons, and two .50 caliber machine guns (see 
Figure 3).  A third craft was the fifty foot Assault Support Patrol Boat (ASPB).  The only 
riverine boat to be designed from the keel up, the ASPB combined elements of a 
minesweeper and destroyer.  Well armed and protected they endured a series of teething 
problems before proving their worth as minesweepers in both the Mekong Delta and I 
Corps.32 
 The manning of the MRF presented a problem. COMNAVFORV would have 
preferred to utilize Marines, but no significant units were available due to their 
assignment in I Corps. Agreeing that the MRF would be a combined operation, Army 
and Navy planners devised an innovative solution. The Army provided troops in the 
form of the 2nd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, who after receiving specialized riverine 
training at Coronado, California, would be integrated with the Navy crews as they 
arrived in Southeast Asia.33    
 
                                                30 Friedman, U.S Small Combatants, 330. 31 Steve Sumrall, transcript of oral interview by Stephen Maxner, August 26, 2002, Oral 
History Project, Texas Tech Vietnam Archive, 9. 32 W.C. Wells, “The Riverine Force in Action, 1966-1967,” Naval Review (1969): 60-
61. 33 Dunnavent, Brown Water Warfare, 117. 
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Figure 2. Armored Troop Carrier (ATC). Source: Norman Friedman, U.S. Small 
Combatants Including PT-Boats, Subchasers, and the Brown-Water Navy: An Illustrated 
Design  
History, 333. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Monitor. Source: Norman Friedman, U.S. Small Combatants Including PT-
Boats, Subchasers, and the Brown-Water Navy: An Illustrated Design History, 329.  
  
 With this unique combination of men and material the MRF came into existence.  
Following its final approval by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in July 1966, the 
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pieces came together with remarkable speed.  By June 1967, fully outfitted with dozens 
of riverine craft and four thousand personnel, the MRF began a series of major 
operations in the Mekong Delta that would last throughout the year.34  Naval historian 
Richard L. Schreadley argued that, “There was literally nowhere in the Delta, given 
navigable water, that the Riverine Assault Force could not go.”35  With its advantages in 
mobility and firepower, the MRF added a powerful new dimension to US military 
operations in the delta. Beyond its military effectiveness, however, one can only estimate 
its initial effect on the dense Vietnamese population.  Compared to the silent sampans 
that had plied the waters of the delta for centuries, the monstrous monitors and ATCs of 
the Mobile Riverine Force must have been a memorable and disturbing sight.   
 While the MRF was growing the sailors and PBRs of Game Warden also 
continued to expand the size and scope of their operations.  After operating primarily 
from converted LSTs such as the USS Benewah (APB 35), anchored near the four river 
mouths of the Mekong Delta, on July 5th 1967 Game Warden’s primary land base was 
completed at Biun Thuy.  Built seven miles upriver from Can Tho, this new base 
provided a secure and centrally located position for future river patrols.36  In September 
a vital supporting element of Game Warden was established with the creation of HA(L)-
3.  Known as the Sea Wolves, this was a specially trained Navy squadron of 22 UH-1 
“Huey” helicopters that provided air support to the RivDivs of Game Warden’, which by 
year’s end numbered well over hundred boats.37 
                                                34 Wells, “The Riverine Force in Action,” 73. 35 Schreadley, “The Naval War in Vietnam,” 292. 36 Swartztrauber, “River Patrol Relearned,” 151. 37 Ibid., 139. 
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Figure 4. South Vietnam Tactical Zones. Source: James H. Wilbanks. The Tet Offensive:  
A Concise History. New York:  Columbia Universty Press, 2007, xix.   
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I Corps 
 As the brown waters sailors steadily expanded the scope of their operations in the 
Delta a very different war was being fought a few hundred miles to the north.  From the 
outset of their involvement in Vietnam the US military had to confront numerous 
legacies from the French colonial system.  One of these was the division of South 
Vietnam into four military and political regions. These geographic zones were adopted 
by MACV and came to represent the American military command and control structure 
of South Vietnam (see Figure 4).  IV Corps, the southernmost zone, comprised the 
sixteen provinces of the Mekong Delta and held almost two-thirds of South Vietnam’s 
total population.  The eleven provinces of III Corps included Saigon and its surrounding 
area, while II Corps consisted of the fabled Central Highlands and the Ia Drang Valley, 
site of the now famous battle that occurred in November 1965.38 
 Furthest to the north lay I Corps.  Adjacent to the Demilitarized Zone and North 
Vietnam, the region comprised five provinces and some of the most formidable terrain in 
Indochina.  A US Army report described the geography of its northernmost region as 
follows:  “Excellent cover and concealment exist throughout most of the area of 
operations and provide both friendly and enemy forces numerous covered approaches to 
attack positions and protection from enemy fire.  The heavy vegetation throughout the 
area of operations consists of a 60-foot-high jungle canopy, elephant grass, and dense 
areas of bamboo and vine thickets, which, combined with the steep slopes, create an 
                                                38 R.L Schreadley, From the Rivers to the Sea:  The United States Navy in Vietnam 
(Annapolis, MD:  Naval Institute Press, 1992), 76. 
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effective natural obstacle to cross-country movement and greatly reduce long-range 
observation.”39 
 
Figure 5. I Corps Map. Source:  James H. Wilbanks. The Tet Offensive:  A Concise 
History. New York:  Columbia University Press, 2007, xx.   
                                                
39 Michael Archer. A Patch of Ground:  Khe Sanh Remembered (Ashland, OR: Hellgate 
Press, 2004), 47.  
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 This was I Corps terrain at its most elemental: rugged, nearly impassable, and 
offering limitless opportunities for cover and ambush.  The two most northern provinces, 
Quang Tri and Thua Thien, were from a military viewpoint the most important due to 
their proximity to the DMZ and their shared border with Laos and North Vietnam (see 
Figure 5)  In the words of an official Army history, the two provinces “presented a 
compact battlefield” of less than eighty miles from north to south and forty miles east to 
west.40  Only two navigable rivers cut through its jungles and mountains.  The Cua Viet, 
its mouth only a few miles from the DMZ, meandered west about three miles until 
making a sharp turn south.  Here the river split, with the main river continuing south to 
the city of Quang Tri and a smaller tributary, the Bo Dieu, curving southwest to the 
strategic town of Dong Ha, the site of a key Marine Corps airfield and home of 
headquarters of the 3rd Marine Division (see Figure 6).   
 Farther south the Huong Giang, better known as the Perfume River for the scent 
of nearby lotus blossoms, passed through the ancient and sacred provincial capital of 
Hue, home to a population of 140,000. 41  The Perfume River was both broad and fairly 
deep, but the Cua Viet was shallow, narrow, and barely navigable, with shoals and 
strong currents creating a challenge for navigation (see Figure 7).  For ground 
transportation the two provinces relied on Route 9, a single east-west road that ran from 
Dong Ha to Laos and the coastal highway, Route 1, which climbs up hair-pin 
switchbacks from the DMZ to Hue and through the notorious Hai Van Pass before 
                                                40 Erik Villard, The 1968 Tet Offensive Battles of Quang Tri City and Hue (Washington, 
DC:  US Army Center of Military History, 2008), 2. 41 Cutler, Brown Water, Black Berets, 275. 
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descending to the coast at Danang, on through Hoi An, and finally to Saigon far to the 
south.42 
 
Figure 6. Dong Ha River Security Group. Source: Author 
 
                                                42 Villard, The 1968 Tet Offensive Battles of Quang Tri and Hue, 4. 
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Figure 7. Hue River Security Group.  Source: Author.  
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 Naval Support Activity Danang, less than sixty miles south of Hue, was the 
center of US Navy operations in I Corps.  Sharing with NSA Saigon the distinction of 
the “end terminus of the world’s longest supply chain,” this critical port grew 
exponentially from its formal establishment on October 15th, 1965, to become one of the 
world’s largest naval logistics complexes.  In 1967 the supply depot square footage of 
the base measured 33,000 and the budget consisted of less than $41 million, yet only two 
years later Danang had grown to over 900,000 square feet of depot space and a budget of 
$102 million.43  By that same year the base was supported by over eight thousand Navy 
personnel and handled up to one million tons of cargo every three months.44  Largely the 
product of the sweat and hard work of U.S. Navy Seabees and civilian engineers, the 
expansion of Danang represented one of the most significant engineering 
accomplishments of the war. 
 The lifeblood of I Corps ran through Danang, as fully ninety percent of all 
logistics in the I Corps provinces of Quang Tri and Thua Thien came in through the 
port.45  Yet as impressive as the establishment and expansion of the port undoubtedly 
were, the truly remarkable logistics feat was done after the material had arrived in the 
port itself.  To support Marine and Army units ravenous for ammunition and supplies in 
I Corps, the Navy relied on a fleet of old but reliable logistic transports, many of which 
were mothballed but serviceable veterans of WWII and Korea.   
                                                43 Frank Collins, “Maritime Support of the Campaign in I Corps,” in Vietnam:  The 
Naval Story, ed. by Frank Uhlig (Annapolis, MD:  Naval Institute Press, 1986), 207. 44 Department of the Navy, US Navy Vietnam Welcome Pamphlet (Washington, DC: 
June 25, 1968), 23-24.  45 S. A. Schwartztrauber, “River Patrol Relearned,” in Vietnam:  The Naval Story, ed. by 
Frank Uhlig (Annapolis, MD:  Naval Institute Press, 1986), 375.  
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 The Navy had begun assuming the responsibility of supplying ground forces in I 
Corps during spring and summer of 1966.  By this time logistics craft such as Landing 
Craft, Utility (LCU) and YFUs (Harbor Utility Craft) had begun making the transit down 
the Perfume River, offloading their cargo at a specially constructed ramp near the 
University of Hue.  After learning that LCUs could navigate the silt filled Cua Viet 
River, MACV ordered NSA Da Dang to operate the route from Danang to the growing 
Marine base at Dong Ha indefinitely.46  From this point on a fleet of underpowered but 
sturdy LCUs and YFUs sailed north almost daily to offload their critical ammunition and 
logistical supplies upriver, which by January 1968 amounted to over 400,000 short tons 
to the I Corps inland ports of Hue and Dong Ha.47  After a shortage of LCUs developed 
in the fall of 1966 the mouth of the Cua Viet was dredged to enable the larger and deeper 
draft LSTs (Landing Ship, Tank) craft to navigate the tricky and shallow river.  During 
this same period a series of supporting logistical commands were established at strategic 
points along both of the major rivers, most notably at the mouth of the Cua Viet and at 
Tan My astride the entrance of the Perfume River.     
 The difficulty of the transit from Danang to Dong Ha cannot be over emphasized.  
Unprotected, underpowered and often loaded with explosive cargo, the slow and aging 
logistics craft made the ninety-mile journey through often-treacherous weather.  The 
monsoon season brought fifteen-foot swells and pounding rain, stretching the transit 
time to Dong Ha from ten to up to thirty-six hours.48   While shorter and less risky, the 
                                                46 Collins, “Maritime Support of the Campaigns in I Corps,” 205. 47 COMNAVFORV Monthly Historical Summary January 1968 (Saigon: February 
1968), 73. 48 Collins, “Maritime Support of the Campaign in I Corps,” 205. 
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Danang-Hue transit was similarly difficult.  Richard Schreadley, a U.S. Navy officer in 
Vietnam and veteran of the brown water navy, later one of its most notable historians 
provided perhaps the finest tribute to these sailors, noting,  “Some of the unsung heroes 
of this war are the captains who guided low-powered and frequently age-weakened ships 
and craft through the treacherous white water of the Cua Viet inlet, and other equally 
hazardous channels in northern I Corps.”49 
 This intricate and complex naval logistics system proved essential for I Corps.  
After the initial landing of two Marine battalions in March 1965 the American ground 
presence in the zone continued to swell, and with it came enormous supply needs.  By 
June 1965 the Marines in I Corps numbered seven battalions and were reorganized into 
the III Marine Amphibious Force.50  After several major and brutal operations against 
the growing NVA presence in I Corps, the Marines were reinforced in October 1966 by 
the first Army combat units, most importantly the 108th Artillery Group, equipped with 
some of the most modern and powerful weaponry in the US arsenal.51  In February 1967 
the area was further reinforced with the arrival of elements of the 101st Airborne and 25th 
Infantry Divisions.52   
 The American military was far from alone in reinforcing I Corps.  After years of 
infiltration through Laos and the DMZ the NVA forces in I Corps had also grown far 
stronger, and by the close of 1967 were estimated to number 30,000 NVA regulars and 
                                                49 Schreadley, “The Naval War in Vietnam,” 293. 50 Willard Pearson, The War in the Northern Provinces, 1966-1968 (Washington, DC:  
Vietnam Studies, Department of the Army, 1975), 6. 51 Villard, The 1968 Tet Offensive Battles of Quang Tri City and Hue, 5. 52 Pearson, The War in the Northern Provinces, 1966-1968, 13. 
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over 20,000 guerillas.53  The situation in I Corps had in many ways come to resemble 
that of Guadalcanal in 1942, a race to resupply and reinforce troops fighting on a critical 
piece of ground.  As a consequence two well-trained and equipped military juggernauts 
engaged each other on the “compact battlefield” of northern I Corps, which had become 
a very crowded place indeed.            
 During these two years Navy brown water units played no major role in I Corps.  
The Mekong Delta and IV Corps was the priority for COMNAVFORV, and while the 
security of Danang and logistics supply were the Navy priorities in I Corps, little 
impetus existed to provide much in the way of protection for the logistics craft. With few 
PBRs or other assets to spare and a lack of concerted opposition, COMNAVFORV saw 
little need to escort the logistics craft on their journey.  The sole exception to this 
strategy was Operation Green Wave.  A trial to determine if the PBRs could operate 
successfully in the narrow and poorly charted rivers of I Corps, Green Wave began in 
late September 1967 when the converted LST (Landing Ship Tank) USS Hunterdon 
County and her ten onboard PBRs began conducting operations in Cua Hai Bay, 
eighteen miles south of Danang.  Patrolling the narrow Cua Dai River, the patrol boat 
crews encountered both considerable NVA resistance and persistent shoal water, as 
groundings in the unfamiliar river were common.  After numerous engagements with 
communist forces ashore but with little for the PBR crews to show for their efforts, the 
operation was cancelled on October 7th.  A cautious and half-hearted operation, Green 
                                                53 Villard, The 1968 Tet Offensive Battles of Quang Tri City and Hue, 5. 
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Wave demonstrated that without better navigational knowledge and logistical support, 
dominating the rivers of I Corps with Navy patrol craft would be problematic.54 
 As 1967 drew to a close the Mekong Delta was a familiar watery battlefield to 
the men of Game Warden and the MRF.  Up and down South Vietnam, despite the vast 
numbers of US military men and weapons assembled and the optimistic projections of 
Westmoreland, American forces were stuck in an apparent stalemate.  The sole river 
incursion into I Corps had proven inconclusive, but MACV’s decision to increase the 
strength of American personnel in the northern provinces meant that the logistics 
requirements for the region would only increase.  The need to establish Task Force 
Clearwater would soon become imminent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                54 Cutler, Brown Water, Black Berets, 273-74. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
THE RIVER WAR MOVES NORTH 
“Nine times out of ten an army has been destroyed 
 because its supply lines have been severed.”  
- General Douglas MacArthur, August 23rd, 1950 
 
 As 1967 ended the American military situation in South Vietnam appeared bleak 
and discouraging to those in power in Washington.  After a long running series of 
disagreements with the Johnson Administration Robert McNamara resigned as Secretary 
of Defense in November 1967.55  The president himself, despite proclaiming full support 
for the war that same month, was also losing confidence.  Fierce disagreements about 
war strategy roiled the relationship between the Johnson Administration and the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, a situation that had worsened since 1965 and encouraged U.S. Army 
general and Vietnam war historian Phillip Davidson to remark that, “An observer, even 
now, wonders where, in 1965-66, the real war was being fought – in the jungles and 
skies of South Vietnam or in the corridors of the Pentagon.”56    
 General William Westmoreland’s strategy of attrition and limited war through 
search and destroy ground missions and sustained air offensives such as Operation 
Rolling Thunder had failed to achieve its stated goals by any objective measure.57  The 
top ranking U.S. military officer in South Vietnam had hoped to utilize American 
superior firepower and mobility to his decisive advantage and grind his enemy down.  
                                                
55 See Robert S. McNamara, In Retrospect:  The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1995). 56	  Phillip B. Davidson, Vietnam at War:  The History 1946-1975 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988), 390.	  57	  Operation Rolling Thunder began on March 2nd, 1965, continuing until November 1st, 
1968 when the massive and intra-service aerial offensive was finally terminated.	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By the close of 1967 his window of opportunity was closing, however, and the strategic 
limitations of further escalation threatened.  Fearful of Chinese and Soviet intervention, 
restrained by the warfighting limitations of a democracy and his own president, and 
faced with an enemy that was adept at fighting a guerilla war, Westmoreland possessed 
limited options.  Unlike most previous conflicts traditional American military 
advantages of firepower, mobility and supporting arms had not proven effective in 
Southeast Asia, and the United States had become trapped in an indeterminate war of 
attrition with no end in sight.      
 With no viable options that could pass political approval Westmoreland remained 
committed to his current strategy.  Meanwhile, under the tightest secrecy the North 
Vietnamese leadership in Hanoi began to develop a new counter strategy.  Discouraged 
by limited but painful American gains in 1966-67, the North Vietnamese Politburo and 
General Staff came to believe that only a massive and decisive thrust could shake 
American confidence, destabilize the RVN government, and accelerate their final 
victory.  As a consequence a bold and aggressive plan was formed.  The strategy that has 
become known to history as the Tet Offensive began to take shape as early as April of 
1967.   In the official North Vietnamese history of the war the strategy that emerged, 
“called for us to concentrate our military and political forces to launch a simultaneous 
surprise attack against the enemy’s weakest point: his urban areas.”58  Though an exact 
record of their deliberations continues to elude historians, in December 1967 the DRV 
                                                58	  As	  quoted	  in	  Pribbenow, Merle L., trans., Victory in Vietnam: The Official History of 
the People’s Army of Vietnam, 1954-1975 (Lawrence, KS:  University Press of Kansas, 
2002), 207. 
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Politburo issued a resolution for the approval of the general offensive.59  Pushed forward 
by several influential party leaders the Tong Cong Kich-Tong Khoi Nghia (General 
Offensive-General Uprising) emerged as a risky but powerful gamble to win the war.60  
 Many details about the General Offensive continue to puzzle historians.  Despite 
considerable scholarship on the subject much of the grand strategy for the offensive 
remains enigmatic, in large part due to the heavy price paid in blood by the North 
Vietnamese and various revisionist interpretations among generals and historians. Most 
historical evidence reveals that the offensive involved three distinct phases, though 
considerable controversy remains over their precise timing and objectives.61  The first 
phase was a series of border attacks launched in the fall of 1967, while the second was 
the Tet Offensive itself in January 1968.  The third phase, planned for April1968, would 
come to be known as mini-Tet by the Americans.62  The cumulative effect of the three-
phase strategy was designed to incite a Viet Cong uprising in South Vietnam and cripple 
American military morale, enabling a negotiated settlement favorable to the North and 
enabling the final reunification of Vietnam.  By July most of the plans for the offensive 
had been finalized, and over the next six months the North Vietnamese reinforced the 
National Liberation Front and Vietcong cadres with significant numbers of men and 
                                                59	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supplies.63 The Viet Cong’s numbers in South Vietnam grew from 204,000 to nearly 
280,000, with a corresponding increase in infantry weapons and explosives.64              
 Vietnam War scholar James H. Wilbanks, author of The Tet Offensive: A Concise 
History, argues in his study that the subsequent offensive went far beyond wresting the 
initiative away from the United States.  Instead he contends that, “The Tet Offensive of 
1968 was the pivotal event of the long Vietnam War.”65  Wartime journalist Don 
Oberforfer echoed this view in his oft quoted study of the offensive, writing that, “The 
Tet Offensive of 1968 was the turning point of the U.S. war in Vietnam.”66  Most 
scholars of the Vietnam War concur and argue that Tet marks a precise and immovable 
dividing line, one that separates the Vietnam War into two distinct stages.  The first were 
the years (1965-67) in which some form of military victory was still possible for the 
United States.  The military situation was stalemated, but Westmoreland nevertheless 
possessed the time and resources to finish the war on acceptable terms.  Once the war 
had entered its post-Tet offensive phase, however, this outcome no longer seemed 
feasible.  Politically, military, and socially too much had become weighted in opposition 
                                                63 The National Liberation Front (NLF), formed in December 1960, was the political 
organization in South Vietnam founded by a mixture of Vietminh officials and various 
communist leaders dedicated to the eventual reunification of Vietnam under a 
communist government.  Over time its guerilla fighters and insurgent personnel became 
popularly known as Viet Cong, or “Vietnamese Communists.” Its relationship with the 
DRV Communist Party remains controversial, but during the Vietnam War NLF leaders 
attempted to minimize the public perception that their organization was controlled by 
Hanoi. Source: William J. Duiker, Sacred War:  Nationalism and Revolution in a 
Divided Vietnam, 132-33. For the best analysis of the NLF’s organization see Douglas 
Pike, Viet Cong:  The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of 
South Vietnam (Cambridge, MA:  MIT Press, 1966).     64 Pribbenow, Victory in Vietnam, 211. 
65 Wilbanks, The Tet Offensive:  A Concise History, xv. 
66 Don Oberdorfer. Tet! The Turning Point in the Vietnam War (Baltimore, MD:  John 
Hopkins University Press 2011), xi.  
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to the American war effort.  For the average U.S. Marine, soldier or sailor in I Corps, 
however, any thoughts about the politics of the war soon took a backseat to surviving the 
ensuing offensive.   
    
Khe Sanh  
 Before the launch of Phase II of the offensive much of MACV’s attention in the 
northern provinces was focused on a small U.S. Marine firebase about seven miles east 
of the Laotian border.  Khe Sanh, a former French base and the site of a U.S. military 
presence since 1962, was the home of the 5,000 man 26th Marine Regiment, augmented 
by the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, an ARVN Ranger Battalion, and the 1st Battalion, 13th 
Marine Artillery.67  The base was isolated from ground transportation except for a single 
road leading up from Route 9, plagued by terrible weather and equipped with only a 
single narrow landing strip.  Located on a plateau surrounded by several hills, which 
would become of critical importance to both sides, Khe Sanh had by January 1968 
become a remote island in a sea increasingly surrounded by PAVN troops.  These facts 
would set the stage for what would become among the most storied battles in the U.S. 
Marines history and one of the most controversial of the Vietnam War.           
 In the closing months of 1967 two experienced NVA infantry divisions 
numbering between 20,000 and 25,000 men had established positions around Khe Sanh. 
Two additional under strength NVA divisions were kept in reserve just across the 
border, for a combined total of almost 40,000 personnel.68  Why had the NVA devoted 
                                                67 Summers, Historical Atlas of the Vietnam War, 138.   68 Davidson, Vietnam at War, 552. 
34 
 
so much manpower to overwhelm a single base so far from the urban centers of South 
Vietnam?  Despite considerable research on Khe Sanh much of the North’s plan remains 
inscrutable even today.  In his history of the famous siege Vietnam War scholar John 
Prados notes that, “Hanoi’s original intentions are not knowable now and may never 
be.”69  From the best modern evidence available it appears that Giap’s original plan was 
to use the assault on the base as a test case to ascertain America’s response to the 
ensuing offensive, stymie any attempt by the Americans to invade Laos, and if possible 
capture the base and deliver a crushing blow to American morale.  As intelligence 
reports revealed the buildup of North Vietnamese forces an increasingly obsessed 
President Johnson told his cabinet that, “I don’t want any damn (sic) Dinbinphoo.”70  
The specter of a repeat of Dien Bien Phu would become a haunting theme to many 
Americans, one that Giap hoped to exploit.71       
 In the early morning hours of January 21st the surrounding NVA divisions 
opened the siege with an intense mortar and rocket barrage.  One Marine freshly arrived 
to the base described the bombardment in his memoirs, writing, “The deafening roar in 
the center of a pitched battle nearly defies description: a seamless earsplitting blend of 
chattering bursts of semi-automatic rifles, the oscillating knock of machine guns, teeth-
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jarring detonations of rocket-propelled grenades, and the deep, reverberating thump of 
exploding mortar shells.”72  One particularly accurate mortar round hit the main 
ammunition dump, detonating over 1500 tons of ordnance in a vast explosion.  A 
subsequent shortage of ammunition would prove crucial in the months to come.73       
 For the next seventy-seven days the Marines and ARVN Rangers endured a 
hellish siege.  Mortar and artillery rounds were a constant threat but deep in the bunkers 
huge rats were even more ubiquitous.  Cut off, isolated and under constant attack, the 
defenders of Khe Sanh refused to yield any ground, and supported by devastating 
artillery and aerial bombardment consistently beat back every assault.  The siege of Khe 
Sanh has inspired a large volume of historical literature as well as controversy, and 
historians continue to debate the merits of the siege and the relative intentions of both 
sides.  A full account of the siege and its various interpretations are beyond the 
boundaries of this study but a brief analysis is useful.  Many historians accuse both Giap 
and Westmoreland of significant errors of judgment during the siege.  John Prados gives 
credit to the NVA and Giap for flexibility but acknowledges that the North Vietnamese 
suffered greatly with little to show for it, and like many others ponders why the Marines’ 
vulnerable water supply was never targeted.74   
 Others Americans argue that Westmoreland wasted valuable time and manpower 
that could have been better employed elsewhere. General Victor Krulak, the head of the 
Pacific Fleet Marine Force and a staunch opponent of Westmoreland’s search and 
destroy strategy, noted that the siege had pinned down enormous U.S. personnel and 
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resources while the NLF and Vietcong executed their larger offensive.  Krulak had long 
advocated a more flexible plan he referred to as the “spreading inkblot” strategy that 
limited the establishment of isolated and vulnerable outposts.75  As to the high NVA 
casualties Krulak noted bitterly that, “Their only investment was blood, to which they 
assigned a low importance.  And when it was over, nothing had changed.”76  
 Philip Davidson, in marked contrast to General Krulak argued in Vietnam at War 
that instead of tying the hands of American units, the 6,000 Marines and ARVN Rangers 
at Khe Sanh immobilized 32,000 to 40,000 of Giap’s best troops. Yet in January 1968 
Westmoreland did not have the benefit of hindsight.  He viewed Khe Sanh as a rare 
opportunity to devastate exposed NVA troops with overwhelming firepower.  Popular 
attention has often focused on the spectacular B-52 Arclight missions that decimated the 
NVA positions and turned the surrounding countryside into a lifeless crater-filled 
landscape.  Yet to keep the Marines fighting Westmoreland needed logistical support in 
the form of airlift.  As the siege continued it was calculated that the combined five 
battalions at the base would require 185 short tons every day, and with the base 
surrounded ground resupply via Route 9 was not possible.77  Beyond the Marines’ stoic 
defense of the base under such adverse conditions, the airlift of men and material into 
Khe Sanh was perhaps its most impressive aspect.     
                                                75	  For a full account of General Krulak’s views on Marine Corps strategy in South 
Vietnam see Victor H. Krulak, First to Fight:  An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps 
(Annapolis, MD:  US Naval Institute Press, 1999).	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 During the seventy-seven day siege Air Force C-130’s and C-123 transports 
landed or air dropped 12,430 tons of cargo to the base.78 Marine Corps aviation utilized 
their CH-46 and UH-34 helicopters to move 4661 tons of ammunition and supplies 
directly to the hills surrounding Khe Sanh in a remarkable feat of aerial resupply.  In an 
article written in 1972 a US Air Force major noted with considerable professional pride 
that the combined use of both aerial bombardment and airlift was the key to the siege. 
“There is no doubt that air power played a decisive role in the defense of Khe Sanh.  But 
other authorities are quick to point out that the action at Khe Sanh demonstrated not only 
the epitome of joint action, but joint combined action.  The US Marine Corps, the US 
Air Force, the various support agencies, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, and the 
US Army each contributed to the effort.”79 
 Nowhere in this list of accolades is there any mention of the U.S. Navy’s role in 
the siege.  From a ground perspective the Navy did have little invested in Khe Sanh. 
Supporting the Marines were a detachment of Navy doctors and corpsmen, a handful of 
chaplains, and one Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer, responsible for coordinating artillery 
and naval air support.80  Sea power, however, did play a role in Khe Sanh, though one 
not as visually impressive as that of the Marine riflemen or Air Force crews.  At the 
most basic level the airlift of Khe Sanh would not have been possible without U.S. Navy 
control of the Cua Viet River.  No airlift could have been implemented without the 
availability of the seaborne logistics traffic from Danang to Dong Ha, site of the primary 
                                                78 Burl W. McLaughlin, “Khe Sanh:  Keeping an Outpost Alive,” Air University Review 
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staging ground for the Air Force and Marine corps air transports and a short flight to the 
encircled base.   
 The escalation of the brown water navy in I Corps was a gradual process, much 
like the overall Navy experience in South Vietnam.  Like the Air Force, which 
developed several innovative methods to supply Khe Sanh in the face of opposing 
ground fire and poor visibility, the Navy also adapted to its new mission in I Corps.  And 
like so much else in the Vietnam War, the siege of an isolated base and the subsequent 
Tet Offensive changed the role of the brown water navy in the northern provinces and 
expanded its reach and responsibilities far beyond any originally intended. 
         
The Tet Offensive 
 For his 1968 New Year radio greeting Ho Chi Minh declared from Hanoi that, 
“This springtime certainly will be more joyous than all such previous seasons, for news 
of victories will come from all parts of the country.  North and South, our people and our 
soldiers will compete in the anti-American struggle.  Forward we go, and total victory 
will be ours.”81  Around 3am on January 31st over eighty thousand Communist troops 
launched a series of coordinated attacks on most of South Vietnam’s cities and 
provincial capitals.  Although at various levels MACV was expecting some form of 
attack, the scale and ferocity of the offensive proved to be an enormous shock.82    
 Far to the north in I Corps the majority of the attacks were concentrated on two 
urban centers, Quang Tri City and Hue.  Of limited strategic and economic importance 
                                                81 Schreadley, From the Rivers to the Sea, 131-32. 82 Wilbanks, The Tet Offensive, 30-31. 
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Quang Tri was located less than thirty miles from the DMZ, and morning of January 31st 
three NVA battalions and supporting sapper teams began their assault.  In a rare piece of 
good fortune, U.S. and ARVN intelligence had received detailed plans of the attack a 
few days prior, and had made significant preparations for the offensive in Quang Tri.  
Over the course of the following week the U.S. Army’s 1st Cavalry Division launched a 
superbly successful counterattack, routing the NVA forces holding the city and inflicting 
over a thousand casualties.83  The success of the American led counterattack can be 
placed upon the shoulders of the ARVN forces defending the city, the exceptional 
intelligence obtained prior to the battle, and of tactics employed by the 1st Cavalry 
Division.84  Superbly executed, this operation deserves far greater historical 
remembrance than it currently holds. 
 To the south of Quang Tri City lay Hue.  Much more than a mere supply 
terminus along the Perfume River, Hue was the visually inspiring heart of ancient 
Vietnam.  Its historic center, the Old Citadel, covers three square miles and contains the 
beautiful towers and pagodas of the early 19th century imperial palace.85  Even more 
importantly than Hue’s architecture was the its sacred nature to many Vietnamese.  
Exactly two years before the offensive General Westmoreland had voiced deep concerns 
about Hue in a conversation with President Johnson.  Pointing out the city’s profound 
significance to the Vietnamese psyche, he laid out the possibility of its capture by the 
communists with candor, arguing that, “Taking it would have a profound psychological 
                                                83 Villard, The 1968 Tet Offensive Battles of Quang Tri City and Hue, 24-25. 84 Pearson, The War in the Northern Provinces, 57.  85 Andrew Lawler, “The Battle for Hue,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 125:7 (July 
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impact on the Vietnamese in both the North and the South, and in the process the North 
Vietnamese might seize the two northern provinces as bargaining points in any 
negotiations.”86          
 In the early morning hours of January 31st three NVA battalions began the assault 
on Hue with a mortar and infantry attack on the Old Citadel.  Due to its unique status 
Hue was lightly defended by ARVN personnel and had been declared off limits to 
American troops prior to 1968.  Within hours the citadel was captured and a yellow NLF 
flag placed atop the fortress gate.87 An American led counterattack soon began, and for 
the next month Marines and ARVN soldiers would be thrust into the most horrific urban 
battle since Stalingrad, paying to recapture the historic city yard by bloody yard.  
 As the offensive burst forth across South Vietnam the U.S. Navy in I Corps was 
ill equipped to respond.  The overwhelming majority of brown water strength was still 
deployed in the Delta, and only a handful of assets were in place to help stem the tide of 
the enemy offensive.  With considerable prescience the senior I Corps ground 
commander had seen the need for additional Navy support months earlier.  Early in 1967 
General Lewis W. Walt, the commander of the III Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) in I 
Corps had made several requests to COMNAVFORV for a significant brown water 
contribution to the northern provinces.  Walt requested a force of about 30 to 40 PBRs to 
provide protection for the logistics craft in I Corps.88  Attacks on logistics craft had risen 
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on the Perfume and Cua Viet Rivers, escalating from the occasional rocket and small 
arms ambush to attacks far more sophisticated. 
 Part of the reason for the increased attacks was a sharp rise in the volume of river 
traffic from Danang.  In December 1965 Danang had begun operations with fewer than 
fifty smaller logistics craft.  By the start of the Tet Offensive this number had grown to 
over two hundred and fifty, along with dozens of support craft such as barges and 
floating cranes.89  This increased number of craft, coupled with ever growing demand 
ashore resulted in over 419,000 short tons being delivered by sea to the combined I 
Corps ports in January 1968, a new monthly record.90  Even with defensive measures 
such as convoying being implemented, the transports represented a more numerous and 
attractive targets.                 
 Mines had also become an increasing problem.  Mining of the rivers had been 
sporadic and largely ineffective in previous years, but in January 1968 the NVA and Viet 
Cong launched a more coordinated campaign against the river traffic.  Many of the 
floating mines used by the NVA during this period were quite crude, in some cases little 
more than five gallon trash cans containing 75mm mortar rounds and a basic contact 
fuse.91  Yet they did the job.  The most intense attacks took place from January 20th to 
24th.  On the 20th while transiting up the Cua Viet an LCM-8 hit a floating mine, 
triggering a secondary explosion that disabled all propulsion and injured one 
crewmember.  The river convoys endured several additional mine attacks, culminating 
on the 24th when another LCM hit an especially powerful mine and quickly sank, killing 
                                                89 Collins, “Maritime Support of the Campaign in I Corps,” 207-8. 90 COMVNAVFORV Monthly Historical Summary, January 1968, 73. 91 MACV Historical Summary, 452.  
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two sailors onboard.92  While most of the U.S. logistics craft survived the attacks due to 
their sturdy construction, it had become clear that additional protective measures beyond 
convoys would be required to protect the transports. 
 COMNAVFORV had not been deaf to General Walt’s request for assistance.  
Though reluctant to part with any brown water assets, Rear Admiral Veth responded to 
the Marines’ request, albeit slowly.  In preparation for a contingent of PBRs to be 
deployed northwards, two PBR Mobile Support Bases were constructed in the U.S. for 
use in I Corps.  Mobile Support Bases were composed from a series of Ammi barges, 30 
by 90 foot pontoons that could be configured to provide a temporary base that supported 
messing and berthing, logistics, and command and control facilities.  The first of these, 
MB-I, arrived in Danang on December 2nd.93  A new division of PBRs, River Division 
55, was activated in the Delta later in the month and by January both the new RivDiv 
and MB-I were in place at Tan My.  At first the Perfume River was the primary concern, 
and on January 9th the ten PBRs began patrolling the river from Tan My to Hue.94 
 The newly christened I CTZ River Patrol Group soon found that their ten boats 
were insufficient to protect the growing logistics traffic on both rivers.  Ambushes with 
B-40 rockets from the shorelines of both rivers were becoming more common,95 and 
numerous command and control problems existed as a new convoy river escort system 
was developed.  A little more than one day before the Tet Offensive erupted 
COMNAVORV sent a message to General Walt requesting information on coordination 
                                                92 Ibid., 77. 93 Charles E. Rogers, “Vietnam River Patrol,” Charles E. Rogers Collection, VA, 34. 94 Schwartztrauber, “River Patrol Relearned,” 375. 95 The B-40 was a Chinese made version of the Soviet RPG-2 (Rocket Propelled 
Grenade), commonly used by NVA and VC forces during the Vietnam War. 
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between ground forces and the PBR crews.  Acknowledging some of the communication 
difficulties General Walt’s staff replied that efforts were being taken to alleviate the 
problem, and that the efforts of the PBR crews were much appreciated, noting that, 
“Naval Support Activity Cua Viet now provides daily convoy on the first run up the 
river.”96  Despite these reassurances coordinating the complex interaction of Army and 
Navy assets in a fluid river environment was becoming more challenging, even before 
the Tet Offensive, threw much of I Corps into chaos. 
 The capture of Hue presented a potential disaster to the American logistics 
system in I Corps.  For the month of January the Perfume/Hue supply route delivered 
nearly 24,000 short tons of supplies. While far from enormous in light of the combined I 
Corps total of 419,000 tons for the month, the loss of Hue put the entire supply line into 
Thua Thien province in jeopardy.97  With it strategic location astride both the river and 
Route 1, Hue was ideally placed as a supply terminus for all of I Corps and its loss could 
seriously jeopardize the counter-offensive effort.  
 In the afternoon of January 31st the River Patrol Group got its first opportunity to 
counter the Tet Offensive.  In an effort to recover access to the logistics ramp on the 
south side of the river eight PBRs raced down the Perfume River to assist ARVN troops 
and Marines in their counterassault on the city.  Encountering heavy rifle and mortar 
fire, they laid down suppressing fire for much of the afternoon until the Marines and 
ARVN forces secured the northern bank later that night, finishing the day’s operations 
                                                96 As quoted in Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Command History, Vietnam 
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with only one naval casualty. The south LCU ramp would remain in American hands for 
the duration of the offensive.98 
 
A Critical Need 
 Logistical access to Hue would prove more vital than anyone in MACV had 
suspected.  On February 2nd the weather in I Corps worsened, bringing a sharp drop in 
temperatures and heavy rain.99  This bad weather partially shut down the airports at 
Quang Tri and Phu Bai, limiting air transport when it was needed the most.  By the first 
week of the offensive U.S. forces in I Corps were using up to 2,600 tons of supplies per 
day.  This was compounded by a series of NVA attacks on land bases logistics.  As the 
offensive began elements of three NVA divisions had effectively cut off all traffic on 
Route 1 north of the Hai Van Pass and saboteurs had cut a key aviation oil pipeline from 
Tan My to Hue.  While it remains unclear exactly how much the attacks on the logistics 
and transportation network was central to North Vietnamese planning, one conclusion is 
obvious: the NVA regarded American supply and communication lines as one of its 
most vulnerable points.100 
 On February 1st Rear Admiral Veth sent a congratulatory message to all units of 
Naval Forces, Vietnam.  Pointing out the high casualties already incurred by the enemy 
he declared that, “The NVA/VC have taken a disastrous beating and heavy losses over 
Tet. They are undoubtedly in a state of confusion and disorganization.  Urge all units 
                                                98 Ibid., 24-25. 99 John Walker, “Chaotic Battle for Hue,” Military Heritage, 10:4 (2009), 26. 100 Pearson, The War in the Northern Provinces, 58. 
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take advantage of the situation to further disrupt and destroy the enemy.”101  While 
North Vietnamese propaganda was often the height of hyperbole, Veth’s message also 
seemed to invoke a surfeit of wishful thinking.  Most U.S Navy sailors in I Corps who 
read the message probably shook their heads and smiled, certain that the admiral was 
only referring to action in the Mekong Delta. To the south in IV Corps the Mobile 
Riverine Force and the PBRs of Game Warden, benefitting from a premature launch of 
the offensive in the Delta fought back tenaciously against the Viet Cong onslaught, 
inflicting heavy casualties during the first forty-eight hours.  Within a few days both task 
forces would play key roles in a highly successful Delta counteroffensive. 102        
  To the north the situation was more problematic for those opposing the General 
Offensive.  For the first days of February a positive outcome for the U.S. and ARVN 
forces fighting in Khe Sanh and Hue hung by a narrow thread.  On February 7th, in the 
first confirmed use of tanks in the war by the North NVA forces overran the U.S Special 
Forces outpost at Lang Vei east of Khe Sanh.  Ten Army Green Berets were killed and 
half of the five hundred Bru Montagnard irregulars were killed or wounded when the 
outpost fell.103  The double blow of the loss of Lang Vei and use of armor gave the 
beleaguered defenders of Khe Sanh considerable pause.  Yet in typical Marine Corps 
fashion shock quickly gave way to preparation.  Many of the exhausted Marines re-
familiarized themselves with the instruction manuals to their Light Anti-Tank Weapon 
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(LAW) rockets in the base armory, while others simply traded anti-personnel grenades 
for high explosive versions, and waited.104   
 A few days after the fall of Lang Vei a fuel laden C-130 from Dong Ha crash-
landed at Khe Sanh after taking heavy fire.  Landing the giant transports was hence 
deemed too risky, forcing the Air Force to use only the less vulnerable but smaller P-23 
Provider transports, further straining the resupply system.105  At Hue the Marines had 
taken to blowing holes in various buildings to force their way through the Citadel, but a 
heavy influx of NVA reinforcements stalled the Marine/ARVN counteroffensive on the 
night of February 6th.106   
 On the rivers the situation was only getting worse. Far from disorganized the 
NVA campaign to disrupt the daily river convoy runs was becoming more sophisticated.  
During the first two weeks of February the level of rocket and mining attacks was 
relatively light along the I Corps waterways.  Yet on February 14th this abruptly 
changed.  Two LCMs were hit by recoilless rifle fire while transiting upriver to Hue, and 
while no personnel casualties occurred these attacks were the forefront of a sharp rise in 
ambushes along the vital waterway.  Over the next six days the logistics craft endured 
unceasing attacks as they attempted to offload their vital cargo.  As the casualties 
increased LCM crews took to piling sandbags around their pilothouses and available 
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Marines resumed their original function of manning the rails on the long ride upriver.107  
The worst period was February 17-19.  Over these seventy-two hours fifteen separate 
LCUs and YFUs were hit and damaged by rocket or mortar fire, killing three and 
wounding seventeen.  As a galling coup de grace on the 19th LCU-1482 was sunk by 
mortar fire while offloading cargo at the Hue ramp.108 
 
Figure 8. YFU making the transit to Hue, February 1968.  Source: Edward J. Marolda, 
The U.S. Navy in the Vietnam War: An Illustrated History, 193. 
  
 Convoys transiting up the now crowded Cua Viet River faced even heavier 
opposition from the NVA and Viet Cong.  With only a few miles separating them from 
the Demilitarized Zone the Cua Viet base was well within range of NVA artillery, and 
on February 4th eight artillery and rocket rounds hit the Cua Viet LCU ramp.  Damage 
was slight but the attack was just a sample of what was to become a fact of life at Cua 
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Viet NSAD.  Scattered mortar and rocket attacks on both the ramp and logistics craft 
continued for the next two weeks of February resulting in nine casualties. Then, on 
February 19th, a major rocket attack was launched against the base, damaging an LCM 
and LST and destroying much of the base fuel capacity.109        
 As the American and ARVN forces continued to battle their way into Hue with 
heavy losses, the Khe Sanh Marines had become limited to one C-ration meal per day. 
The “C-Rats” were the forerunner of the MRE (Meals Ready to Eat), and like their 
replacements were often categorized into tasty or inedible versions.  New combat 
uniforms or hot meals were unheard of luxuries, as fuel and ammo received airlift 
priority.110  With much of MACV and the world’s attention focused on I Corps the 
heightened importance of the Perfume and Cua Viet Rivers logistical lifelines became 
even more apparent.  
 By the third week in February the logistics capacity of I Corps was strained to the 
breaking point.  With considerable foresight General Abrams had ordered that only 
supplies necessary for warfighting be brought into I Corps, and warned that, “Anyone 
who brings in nonessentials is interfering with the conduct of this war.”111 Moving even 
these essentials was proving ever more difficult, as the attacks on both I Corps river 
convoys took their toll (see Figure 8).  The Perfume River convoys delivered less than 
5,700 tons to Hue in the month of February, one quarter of January’s total.112  Yet each 
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ton delivered was priceless, and only by keeping these critical lines of communication 
open and functional could the flow of supplies in I Corps be maintained. 
 
The New Task Force     
 Exactly thirty days after the siege of Khe Sanh began General Abrams sent a 
pointed directive from his forward command at Phu Bai to Rear Admiral Veth in Saigon.  
Abrams described the situation in I Corps with little ambiguity:  “There is an immediate 
requirement to improve the naval supply of the troops fighting the Battle of Hue. The 
principal problem is the coordination of movement of LCUs and LCMs from Tan My to 
Hue.  Additionally there is the problem of moving troops, supplies, and equipment north 
from the ramp southeast of Hue for offloading at the northeastern ramps.”  Abrams went 
on to describe the lack of defensive naval assets requested previously by III MAF, such 
as PBRs and ASPBs, as well as a lack of coordination with aviation assets and artillery.  
 Concluding his message Abrams laid out his demand for COMNAVFOR: 
“Therefore, it is mandatory that a task force be organized to insure full coordination of 
these assets in order to keep the waterways secure.  This Task Force will direct its 
immediate attention to improving naval supply of forces fighting the Battle of Hue.  This 
same force can simultaneously coordinate operations in the Cua Viet River area.”113  
Abrams’ firm request required that the new task force be operational within three 
days.114 
                                                113 As quoted in MACV 1968 Command History, 461-62. 114 Schreadley, From the Rivers to the Sea, 140. 
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 Unlike the previous request from General Walt this order could not be delayed.  
Though fully engaged in the Mekong Delta Veth moved quickly and directed that the 
task force be established at the earliest opportunity.  New personnel and equipment were 
flown to Dong Ha, and only twenty-four hours after the deadline had ended the basic 
elements were in place.  Setting up his headquarters onboard Mobile Base I at Tan My 
on February 24th U.S. Navy Captain Gerald W. Smith assumed command of the new 
task force in a brief ceremony.  For reasons that are still unclear the new task force was 
never assigned a number, only a name: Clearwater.115  After more than a year of delays 
and missteps, Task Force Clearwater, a brown water U.S. Navy command that would be 
responsible for the whole of I Corps inland maritime operations, had finally come into 
existence. 
 From its inception the new task force faced all but insurmountable problems.  
PBRs were in short supply and reinforcements were more than a week away from 
delivery. Another difficulty was the task force’s new headquarters.  By February 1968 
NSAD Tan My was well established as a satellite supply base for Danang.  Located at 
the northwest tip of the barrier Vinh Loc Island adjacent to the sheltered entrance of the 
Perfume River, the supply base consisted primarily of a bladder fuel farm and a Marine 
security detachment.116  Much of the 50,000-barrel fuel farm had been destroyed during 
the first few days of the offensive and was still being rebuilt by mid-February.117  Tan 
My’s critical importance lay in its function as the eastern terminus of the aforementioned 
fuel pipeline that ran to Hue and then Phu Bai, which had been cut but then repaired 
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during the offensive.  Other than Mobile Base I, which had been moored at the mouth of 
the Perfume a few miles from Tan My, the base had little infrastructure in place to 
support a brown water task force.118       
 Upon taking command Captain Smith made a number of immediate decisions for 
the task force.  Although initially created to protect the passage to Hue, less than a day 
after being created TFCW (Task Force Clearwater) was also tasked with the securing 
traffic along the Cua Viet River.  In response to that directive—on February 29th—Smith 
divided his limited forces administratively into two groups: the Hue River Security 
Group and the Dong Ha River Security Group.  In a move that reflected the changing 
situation on the rivers and the poor suitability of Tan My, that same day overall 
command headquarters of the task force was shifted to NSAD Cua Viet.119 
 
Figure 9. Aerial view of Cua Viet Base. Photo courtesy Herman Hughes.  
                                                118 Swartztrauber, “River Patrol Relearned,” 398. 119 Ibid., 376.  
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Figure 10. Cua Viet Base Ramp, March-April 1968. Photo courtesy of Herman Hughes 
 
 
 Strategically located on the sandy south bank of the river’s mouth, Cua Viet was 
a dreary place, more resembling a ramshackle boomtown than a U.S. Navy installation 
(see Figures 9,10).  The base expanded considerably from its founding in the summer of 
1967, and in the words of one naval officer had been, “transformed from a beautiful, 
white, unoccupied, sandy beach into an ugly, but thriving, cantonment of plywood huts 
and mess halls.”120  Richard Schreadley was far less poetic, calling Cua Viet, “one of the 
grimmest places to pull duty in all Vietnam.”121  Of the omnipresent sand he noted that, 
“When the rain stopped falling, the sand, fine-grained and gritty, began to blow, 
accumulating in drifts before the huts, sifting through screens and under doors, finding 
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its way into lockers and between sheets and even into the food the men ate.”122  Within 
the extreme range of NVA artillery and subject to punishing storms, Cua Viet was 
indeed less secure and hospitable than Tan My.  Yet despite the miserable conditions, 
weather, and exposure to enemy fire the move to the more northerly base would soon 
prove prescient.  
 From this new staging area Captain Smith was tasked with providing waterborne 
security for all inland waterways between Danang and the DMZ.  While nominally 
under the administrative command of COMNAVFORV, TFCW reported operationally 
to General Abrams at Phu Bai in I Corps.  Fortunately for Captain Smith a squadron of 
helicopter gunships, ground artillery batteries, and a contingent of Marines were 
promptly placed under his direct command to defend the logistic transports.  Several 
LCM-6 craft from Danang converted to perform minesweeping duties were also placed 
at his disposal.  COMNAVFORV also directed Captain Richard Salzer, the head of the 
Mobile Riverine Force, to transfer one of his river divisions north.  Loaded onboard a 
U.S. Navy amphibious warship this force of ten ATCs, three monitors, and one CCB 
was set to arrive at Tan My in early March.123   
 
Keeping the Rivers Open 
 While the growth and administrative development of TFCW unfolded the daily 
convoy runs to Hue and Dong Ha continued unabated, as did the increasing attacks.  On 
February 24th, the first full day of Clearwater’s existence, the daily convoy to Hue 
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consisting of nine logistics craft escorted by two PBRs came under rocket attack from 
both sides of Perfume River.  After passing the final bend to the Hue ramp two LCUs 
took RPG fire to their starboard side, killing one and wounding two crewmembers.  
After offloading their cargo the convoy was again attacked on the return leg. LCU-1517, 
already hit on the upriver transit, had the misfortune to take yet another RPG round to 
starboard.  This second round of attacks did not result in any casualties, however, and all 
of the convoy craft managed to reach Cua Viet safely.124 
 The U.S. Navy summary message for this action included one especially 
important conclusion.  Noting that each boat in the convoy was now equipped with the 
latest in tactical radios, the message concluded that, “Convoy commander was able to 
effectively control convoy for first time.”  The message also recorded the effective cover 
provided by supporting U.S. Army Huey helicopter gunships, a pair of which provided 
suppressing fire for the convoy from overhead.125  The use of effective communications 
between the river and aviation assets would prove one of the new task force’s greatest 
strengths. 
 The command and control changes continued, and by the end of February the 
communications improvements were only part of a now systematized convoy system put 
in place. Both river security groups quickly adopted a two-part convoy plan, consisting 
of a movement unit and an escort unit.  The movement unit was comprised of the 
logistics craft, typically three or four LCMs or LCUs.  The escort unit was initially 
limited to only PBRs, but as more forces arrived the task force incorporated ATCs and 
                                                124 (CTF Opsum) 241500Z FEB 1968. 125 Ibid. 
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CCB craft as well.  All fell under the control of a single convoy commander who 
coordinated air, artillery, and mine countermeasure support.126 
 Along the Perfume River the establishment of the new task force had an almost 
immediate effect on convoy operations.  The official report from the February 26th 
convoy provides a good example of how much river operations had improved in a few 
short days.  An especially large convoy of six U.S. Navy and four VNN logistics craft 
departed Tan My at mid morning, escorted by four PBRs and one LCM-6 minesweeper. 
Aerial support was provided by two Army UH-1 gunships.  After leaving Tan My the 
message reads, “Preplanned artillery missions fired into ambush sites as the convoy 
moved up the river.  At 1100H the convoy came under B-40/41 attack.  Fire was 
suppressed by combined fire of gunships, PBRs, and convoy craft.” Two U.S. Army 
personnel were wounded in the attack but the convoy reached the ramp at Hue without 
further incident.  After returning to Tan My a second convoy transited upriver that 
afternoon.  Although the convoy took fire near the same ambush site as the morning 
convoy no hits were reported. The convoy reached Hue to offload and made an 
uncontested transit back to Tan My.127  
 This February 26th message contained several elements of note.  The preplanned 
bombardment of suspected shoreline ambush sites, complex control of artillery and air 
assets, and swift offloading of supplies demonstrated remarkable teamwork and 
coordination.  Proactive rather than reactive measures were becoming common.  Yet the 
shoreline ambushes along the Perfume continued.  The following day the afternoon 
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convoy came under rocket fire before reaching Hue, and on this occasion the B-40 
rockets found their mark.  Hit by three rockets, YFU-12 became engulfed in flames and 
exploded, wounding four crewmembers and damaging a nearby PBR, which had to be 
towed to Hue to prevent its sinking.  The YFU was a total loss.128       
 Despite these casualties the Hue River Security Group achieved its primary 
mission, providing supplies to enable the recovery of Hue.  On March 2nd, after U.S. and 
ARVN forces secured the Citadel and pushed out the last remaining NVA personnel, the 
battle for Hue was declared over.  Most of the once beautiful Citadel lay in ruins, and 
forty percent of the surrounding city was decimated.  Civilian loss of life was 
enormous—not just from combat but also from the systematic execution of local South 
Vietnamese government officials and Catholic priests deemed to be enemies by the 
Communists and their supporters.  Over 2,800 were tortured and executed in the first 
week of the siege.  Military casualties were also heavy. The Marines lost 147 dead and 
almost 900 wounded, while the ARVN battalions suffered the loss of virtually twice as 
many casualties, 384 men dead and 1,800 wounded.129 
 On the opposing side the losses were far greater.  The combined NVA and Viet 
Cong dead at Hue has been estimated at over five thousand, with an unknown number of 
wounded. Compounded with this was the psychological loss of Hue itself, a high prize in 
the Vietnamese psyche.  One analysis of the battle complimented the North’s initial 
execution but criticized them for their subsequent failures, noting “The North 
Vietnamese had orchestrated a sound plan of attack to enter the city-but once inside, they 
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failed to secure the city’s centers of gravity.  Specifically, they failed to seize the South 
Vietnamese headquarters in the Citadel, the MACV compound, and the boat ramp on the 
south side.”130 
 Of these three, the failure to capture the LCU ramp was most damaging.  The 
U.S. Navy’s ability to deliver men and supplies to a point directly adjacent to the Citadel 
proved fatal to the North’s efforts to hold Hue.  Even before the city was officially 
declared secure this ability to deliver logistics directly to the battle had been recognized.  
Lieutenant General John Cushman, who had relieved General Walt as the head of the III 
MAF, commended the men of Clearwater with this message dated February 28th:  “The 
outstanding manner in which badly needed supplies are transported to Dong Ha through 
the Cua Viet waterway, and to Hue via the Perfume River is indicative of the bravery 
and superb leadership of all the boat crews involved in this critical combat operation.  
The battle at Hue depended heavily on this effort, as does support of the large forces in 
the Dong Ha area.  Despite considerable harassment by the enemy and in the face of 
great danger, you performed magnificently.”131        
 The loss of Hue was a major blow to the communist momentum in I Corps.  This 
defeat combined with the enormous casualties incurred throughout South Vietnam 
proved devastating to the Viet Cong.  Losses were so great that the southern cadres were 
decimated for years, forcing much of the responsibility for war on the NVA.132    Many 
of the surviving Viet Cong units in Thua Thien Province melted into the jungles or fled 
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across the border to Laos, and with their retreat U.S./ARVN forces were finally available 
in sufficient numbers to secure the banks of the Perfume River.  In the days after the re-
capture of Hue attacks on the logistics convoys fell to levels not seen in over a year, and 
on March 3rd the use of convoys was discontinued along the river in favor of individual 
transits. As an indication of just how much security had changed during the remainder of 
the month only single attack occurred, when on March 25th when an LCU was hit by 
rocket fire four miles from Hue. Except for this incident the Perfume River was oddly 
tranquil for the month of March.133   
 On the Cua Viet the situation was very different.  Rocket and mine attacks 
continued into March, but these methods were not the only measures of resistance 
employed, and on March 4th a convoy from Cua Viet discovered a new problem.  In the 
early morning hours NVA engineers had constructed an ingenious underwater wire and 
bamboo obstruction spanning a narrow portion of the Cua Viet River.134  Upon reaching 
the sturdy barrier the convoy commander wisely chose to reverse course and return to 
Cua Viet, as “approximately 20 people in black dress” believed to be NVA were 
observed preparing to set up mortars on the shoreline.  The obstruction was soon 
destroyed by an airstrike and the convoys resumed, but the use of this barrier marked 
one of the rare occasions when no daily convoy reached Dong Ha.135  
 The following day the daily logistics run incurred an unusual loss.  The convoy 
commander, Lieutenant Barry Hooper, suffered fatal wounds while leading his convoy 
through heavy small arms fire.  Two other sailors were wounded but his was the only 
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fatality.136  A very different attack took place on the morning of March 10th.  An NVA 
artillery strike scored several direct hits on the Cua Viet base, exploding over one 
hundred tons of ammunition and igniting fires throughout the complex.  Casualties were 
light but the infrastructure damage, which included the mess hall and the 
communications center, was extensive.  With quick repairs, however, communications 
were restored and sixty percent of the base rebuilt by the end of March.137      
 Despite the regular attacks, a quiet day along the Cua Viet was not unknown.  
One the best accounts of such a transit was documented by Peter Braestrup, a journalist 
later known for his account of the media coverage of the Tet Offensive.138  Drawing on 
an interview with Petty Officer Gilbert Hirshaeuer, Braestrup described a daylight 
logistics run from Dong Ha to the Cua Viet base. The green river was “full of shallow 
draft vessels,” he wrote, and once the LCM reached “the straight stretch of the river,” the 
tension onboard grew considerably.  Hirshaeuer threw on his helmet as enemy artillery 
rounds landed a few hundred yards away.  Another crewman readied the heavy machine 
gun but the NVA guns quickly fell silent.  At one point Hirshaeuer pointed to broken 
hull of an LCM sunk by a mine the previous month, telling the journalist that, “Right 
now we worry more about home-made mines than anything else.” After the remainder of 
the transit proved uneventful he brought his LCM alongside the anchored LST USS 
Bullock County to move his cargo of a damaged tractor onboard.  Asked what his return 
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trip cargo would be Hirshaeuer responded that he didn’t know, but ever the blunt sailor 
he quipped, “When we carry fuel we can’t get any Marines to ride with us.”139 
 The American media were not the only ones who recognized the importance of 
the Cua Viet.  In a North Vietnamese editorial entitled “Glorious Exploits by Heroic Cua 
Viet,” the attacks on the U.S. logistics traffic were recounted mixed with grand 
hyperbole.  The author noted that over the course of the war communist forces, “sank or 
damaged more than 200 warships, and buried thousands of American and puppet troops 
as well as hundreds of thousands of tons of military equipment.”  Grandiose 
embellishment notwithstanding the editorial did contain one accurate assessment: 
“Facing multiple difficulties in rear-line logistics, the Americans and their puppets are 
trying to use to the maximum the rivers, hoping to break the deadlock found in ground 
transportation and to reduce the burden of air transport costs.”  Excluding the word 
“puppets,” most U.S. military supply officers would have agreed with this.140 
 The real story of the Cua Viet in March 1968 lay between these divergent 
accounts. Rocket and small arms attacks continued throughout the month, but as 
Hirshaeuer noted the fear of mines was well-founded.  On March 14 the Dong Ha River 
Group recorded its largest single daily loss when an ATC minesweeper hit a large 
contact mine two miles northeast of Dong Ha.  Estimated at over nine hundred pounds, 
the mine’s detonation upended the seventy-foot armored craft and killed six 
crewmembers.141  This loss resulted in adjustments to minesweeping tactics along the 
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river but in spite of the diverse obstacles the supplies continued to get through, and at the 
close of the month over 46,000 short tons of material had been delivered to Dong Ha.142       
  The continuous movement of supplies upriver from Cua Viet to the airfield at 
Dong Ha remained vital following the recapture of Hue because that airfield was 
originating point for helicopter flights to Khe Sanh.  The five battalions at the besieged 
outpost at Khe Sanh, deprived of everything but ammunition and C-rations, continued to 
throw back repeated NVA assaults.  Operation Pegasus, the joint U.S. 
Army/ARVN/Marine Corps operation to reopen Route 9 and lift the Khe Sanh siege, 
began on April 1st.  By that date many of the opposing NVA infantry had retreated or 
had fallen dead to the 100,000 tons of ordnance released from above,143 a bombardment 
so destructive that one American general remarked that the burnt ground surrounding 
Khe Sanh was “like the surface of the moon.”144 Elements of the 1st Marines and ARVN 
airborne troops moved west along Route 9, encountering light resistance.  On the 8th the 
supporting U.S Army 1st Cavalry Division linked up with the 26th Marines at Khe Sanh, 
finally reopening the land route to the base, thus ending the siege.   
 Upon his arrival at what remained of Khe Sanh the commander of the 1st Cavalry 
Division, Major General John Tolson was stunned at the conditions he encountered. “It 
was a very distressing sight,” he later described, “completely unpoliced, strewn with 
rubble, duds, and damaged equipment, and with the troops living a life more similar to 
rats than human beings.” Just over four hundred Marine and ARVN personnel perished 
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in the siege.  Precise North Vietnamese casualties have never been ascertained, but most 
estimates place them at between ten and fifteen thousand personnel.145  
 For the first three months of 1968 U.S. Navy casualties on the rivers of I Corps 
numbered twenty-three dead and just over a hundred wounded.146  Compared to the 
hundreds of Marine and ARVN casualties incurred to push back the Tet Offensive in the 
northern provinces these losses may appear miniscule, but the operations conducted by 
the men and vessels of the task force had an impact far beyond their numbers.  Their 
efforts kept the supply lines open.  Perhaps the most heartfelt tribute to the U.S Navy 
sailors in I Corps came from Marine Corps Lieutenant General Victor Krulak.  The head 
of the Fleet Marine Force Pacific thanked the brown water sailors in a message dated 
April 10th, wrote with his customary bluntness, “The Cua Viet and Perfume Rivers are 
critical to the operational survival of our forces.  The enemy knew this and, from the 
start of the Tet Offensive, was determined to cut them both.  That they were 
unsuccessful is largely due to the gallant determination of the Navy forces operating the 
landing ships, landing craft and river fire support crafts.  Despite the most determined 
enemy resistance, and in the face of continuing casualties, they kept the supplies 
moving.  In doing so, they once again earned the gratitude of their brothers in the Navy-
Marine Corps team.”147              
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CHAPTER III 
 
HARSH DUTY AND DIVERSE THREATS 
 
“Since its inception, the Cua Viet base had been subjected to frequent shellings and 
occasional attempted intrusions by sappers.  The prudent man was never very far from 
his helmet, flak jacket, or personal weapon.” Thomas J. Cutler, “Brown Water, Black 
Berets” 
 
 In his study of modern shipboard life historian Ronald Spector observed that, 
“The [U.S.] navy, preoccupied with supercarriers and Polaris submarines, had no desire 
to design and build really effective small combatants for its unwelcome brown-water 
war in South Vietnam.”  For all of their improbable success the sailors of the brown 
water navy relied on the old and untested.  The monitors of the Mobile Riverine Force 
may have been destructive river behemoths but at their core were tired assault craft of 
previous wars.  Even the sublimely effective PBR, while new, was a hastily conceived 
modification of a civilian design.  Yet Spector conceded that while they lacked the best 
technology and funding the men who manned the LCMs and PBRs possessed something 
their blue water counterparts did not, writing, “Unlike the thousands of sailors deployed 
aboard ships in the Tonkin Gulf, who seldom saw the coast of Vietnam, riverine sailors 
had little doubt they were in a real war.”148   
 Close quarters combat, an experience little known by U.S. Navy sailors since the 
Second World War, was commonplace on the rivers of South Vietnam.  As naval 
weaponry advanced the likelihood of sighting, let alone shooting at any enemy in visual 
range fell dramatically.  Yet in Vietnam sailors previously trained to launch missiles at 
distant targets were called upon engage an enemy at the naval equivalent of arm’s 
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length.  A late 20th century version of maritime shock combat provided participants with 
a shared sense of danger that gave sailors in the brown water navy a unique culture 
within the larger service and in which many were called upon to lead and take risks.   
 Assignment to duty with the riverine forces in Vietnam was less than popular 
with many officers.  Having been trained for a confrontation with the Soviet Navy on the 
open ocean, they resisted serving on the rivers of Vietnam.  One Navy captain who 
served on the COMNAVFORV staff recalled this trend, noting that many young officers 
were not, “afraid to go to Vietnam, but they just did not see how it was going to help 
their careers.”149  A tour as a gunnery officer or department head was seen as the ticket 
to advancement rather than the messy and dangerous world of Operation Game Warden 
or Market Time.  This deprived the brown water river divisions of much needed 
leadership, so to fill the void sailors not yet old enough to buy a beer back home found 
themselves pushed into roles few had anticipated.  This newfound leadership status, 
coupled with their distinctive mission and proximity to combat, gave the brown water 
sailors a harsh but unique experience in a long and brutal war.  
   Nearly all brown water sailors were volunteers, often bored with life aboard ship 
and possessing the desire to take up a different challenge.  Petty Officer David White, 
onboard the dock landing ship USS Monticello (LSD-35), was typical of this group.  He 
volunteered for the PBRs after a port visit to Danang in early 1968, less than two years 
after joining the Navy.  White signed up for river patrol duty because he felt, like many 
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before him, that “everybody secretly probably wants to know what combat’s like.”150 
During three months of PBR training at Mare Island, California, White learned the 
techniques of river seamanship, weapons fundamentals, and other basic boat skills. 
Taught by veterans of Operation Game Warden, this PBR program was followed by two 
weeks of survival training and Vietnamese language school.  Within a week of arriving 
at Tan Son Nhut Airport in Saigon, White was patrolling the waters of the Mekong 
Delta.151       
 White’s story is typical of the sailors of Task Force Clearwater.  Like so many 
others he arrived in an alien environment far different from anything he had previously 
experienced in the Navy.  Most sailors who trained for the brown water navy did so with 
the understanding that the Mekong Delta would be their future home, but in time some 
were transferred to the north, possibly expecting it to be an improvement over the hot 
and fetid Delta. But duty on the northern rivers of I Corps was often harsher than that of 
the Mekong.  In terrain, mission, and environment the men of Task Force Clearwater 
lived and worked in an isolated world of their own, beaten down by both the enemy and 
the elements while serving at a base only four miles from the DMZ.   
    
Life on the Northern Rivers 
 By April 1968 the tempest of the Tet Offensive had subsided and a gradual sense 
of dull routine, punctuated by deadly attacks, began to develop on the northern rivers of I 
Corps.  Along the Perfume River communist activity was at low ebb at the end of March 
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and on April 3rd the commanding officer of Task Force Clearwater discontinued the 
convoy system in favor of individual escorted transits to Hue. The sole ambush of the 
month occurred on April 25th when an LCU took damage from a RPG attack about four 
miles from Hue.152  Along the Cua Viet ambushes were still common in March but had 
also fallen off considerably.  Five logistics craft and the 300-foot gasoline tanker USS 
Genessee (AOG-8) anchored at Cua Viet sustained damage from rocket and mine attacks 
during the same period.153 
 During the first week of March, River Assault Division 112, a MRF Division, 
was redeployed to the Cua Viet River from the Mekong Delta.  Comprised of ten ATCs 
(Armored Transport Carriers), three monitors, and one CCB 
(Command/Communications Boat),154 the division was assigned to the Dong Ha river 
group, while the Hue force continued to use the ten PBRs already present and five LCMs 
converted into minesweepers.155  The welcome addition of the riverine craft from the 
Delta (see Figure 11) led the leadership of TF Clearwater to reassess the unit’s roles in 
light of its new capabilities.  In early April a message to COMNAVFORV noting that in 
addition to its previous mission of protecting logistics traffic along the Cua Viet River, 
the Dong Ha security group could now provide naval gunfire from the monitors to 
                                                152 MACV Command History, 463.   153 COMNAVFORV Monthly Historical Summary, April 1968, 69.  154 The CCB was designed as a riverine floating command boat, with one assigned to 
each Mobile Riverine Force squadron. Externally similar to the monitors, but lacking the 
main armament of the 105mm howitzer and 81mm mortar, they had a command and 
control console instead and carried extra communications equipment to coordinate 
brown water operations. Source: W.C. Wells, “The Riverine Force in Action, 1966-67,” 
57. 155 Thomas J. Cutler, Brown Water, Black Berets:  Coastal and Riverine Warfare in 
Vietnam (Annapolis, MD:  Naval Institute Press), 277-78. 
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support the 3rd Marine Division, “utilize ATCs for quick insertion of troops in area 
suspected to be occupied by enemy,” and its vessels had commenced night patrols to 
stop enemy mine laying operations on April 1st.156 
 
Figure 11. Dong Ha River Security Group Monitor. Photo courtesy Herman Hughes. 
 
 The riverine sailors who had previously served on the vast and risky Delta soon 
discovered that the smaller northern rivers were just as dangerous, and that navigating 
the tricky currents of the Cua Viet was a challenge in and of itself.  The slow riverine 
craft had little room to maneuver in the narrow waterway, and while the monitors 
brought unprecedented firepower to I Corps the lack of bunkers and emplacements along 
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the river provided few targets.  Instead the large and slow riverine craft became targets 
themselves. 
 Just like the Delta, however, the threat from mines and rocket attacks was quite 
real.  Though equipped with significantly more armor than the PBRs the riverine craft 
were far from invulnerable.  One ATC sailor interviewed after the war described an RPG 
attack, recalling that while watching the shoreline a concealed Viet Cong abruptly, 
“stood up with one of the B-40 rocket launchers, took his time to aim at my boat, 
released the rocket in a puff of black smoke, and it was the typical slow motion thing. 
The rocket came, missed me by about six feet, missed our boat by about six inches.” 
Other times his ATC was not so fortunate, however, and he remembered later inspecting 
the damage from a hit to his boat’s armor plate, “It would look like you had a cutting 
torch and you would cut a piece of one inch metal.” During the worst hits shrapnel from 
the rocket would ricochet around the interior of the craft, killing or injuring nearly 
everyone inside.157   
 The presence of the monitors and most of the ATCs would turn out to be short-
lived.  On May 1st five more PBRs were delivered to Cua Viet, and at the end of May 
most of the riverine craft there were transferred back to the Delta.  Capable of only eight 
knots the monitors’ and ATCs sluggishness proved to be an impediment in I Corps 
where the greater speed of patrol boats was deemed more essential. Another factor was 
that repair facilities for the larger craft were less available on the northern rivers.  Most 
important, with the threat to the logistics craft on the northern rivers diminished 
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COMNAVFORV decided the boats would be of better use in future riverine operations 
in the Delta.  Six of the ATCs remained behind for a few months, but by the year’s end 
they had been replaced by LCM-6 craft specially modified for minesweeping.158 
 The existing PBRs of Clearwater were soon augmented by two brown water craft 
that could not have been more dissimilar.  The first, eight Landing Craft Personnel, 
Large (LCPL) boats were assigned to Tan My in May.  The poorly named LCPL (see 
Figure 12) was in some ways an older and larger cousin of the PBR.  Originally designed 
as a command boat to direct amphibious landing craft to their targeted beach, in 1965 a 
number of the mothballed craft were converted for river patrols as a stop-gap measure 
before the PBRs arrived in South Vietnam the following year.  Navy engineers, in the 
words of brown water veteran Thomas Cutler, “stripped off years of accumulated paint, 
reinforced rust-thinned areas, repaired the tired old diesels, and mounted a veritable 
arsenal of weapons,” on the thirty-six foot boats.159 The LCPL’s deeper draft of almost 
four feet made them poorly suited for river operations, however, and the boats were used 
primarily as harbor patrol craft at Danang and Saigon.  Still, desperate for more 
resources Task Force Clearwater took possession of eight of the rebuilt craft before the 
close of the year.160 
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Figure 12. LCPL. Source: Edward J. Marolda, The U.S. Navy in the Vietnam War: An 
Illustrated History, 253. 
 
 
 As June drew to a close three of the most unusual vessels in the history of the 
U.S. Navy made their debut in I Corps when a trio of Patrol Air Cushion Vehicle 
(PACV) hovercraft became operational with the Hue river group.  Nicknamed the 
‘monster,” the forty-foot PACV (see Figure 13) was developed from a seven-ton British 
civilian design.  Only six saw service in the course of the Vietnam War, three with U.S. 
Navy and three with the Army.161  Supremely fast (up to fifty knots) and armed with 
multiple heavy machine guns, the hovercraft’s speed was only matched by its noise, with 
some witnesses reporting hearing the strange craft over seven miles away.  Mechanical 
problems and high acquisition and operating costs also limited their availability.162 
                                                161 Norman Friedman, U.S. Small Combatants Including PT-Boats, Subchasers, and the 
Brown-Water Navy: An Illustrated Design History (Annapolis, MD:  Naval Institute 
Press, 1987), 308-09.  162 For the cost of just one PACV ($1 million US in 1966) the Navy could purchase ten 
of the latest Mk II PBR’s. Source: Schwartztrauber, “River Patrol Relearned,” 390. 
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Figure 13. PACV. Source: Norman Friedman, U.S. Small Combatants, 309.  
 
 The PACV’s were first tested in the Mekong Delta, where the thick rice paddies 
and narrow canals limited their effectiveness.  Following their arrival in I Corps, 
however, the speedy craft found a true home, as the lagoons and open bays surrounding 
Hue proved ideal for their capabilities.163  The hovercrafts’ quickness made them the 
perfect craft for the rapid insertion of personnel into hostile areas, and on July 22nd two 
PACV’s rapidly inserted a combined U.S. Marine and ARVN patrol team into a village 
near Tan My, marking the hovercrafts’ debut in an offensive capacity.  The 
psychological impact of the bizarre craft, noisily hurtling down a waterway at forty 
knots, was another aspect of their presence hard to deny.164  One naval intelligence 
officer who accompanied a PACV on patrol recorded that the monstrous craft terrified 
Vietnamese fisherman, and recalled that his boat, “looked like a giant dragon, and we 
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came roaring up to this fishing boat, and I’ve never seen such frightened people in all my 
life.”165  
 This amalgam of the rebuilt old and the unorthodox new epitomized Task Force 
Clearwater’s reputation as an organization that had to fight for everything in its arsenal.  
The combined total force of eight LCPLs and three PACVs nevertheless proved quite 
useful on the northern rivers, and over time became key components of the task force.  
For the heart of the river war, however, the PBRs remained the workhorse of choice.  
Even before the Tet Offensive PBR crews in the Mekong Delta had earned a lasting 
reputation.  One U.S. naval officer described them as an inimitable component of the 
maritime effort in South Vietnam, writing, “The PBRs form a truly remarkable 
organization, without precedent in the U.S. Navy.  Born of necessity, developed in bitter 
individual combat, and seasoned by countless examples of courageous and heroic 
performances by the PBR crews, Operation Game Warden has challenged the Viet Cong 
in their own environment, and has defeated them.”166  Noted for their bravery and 
dedication under fire many PBR sailors were decorated for their actions. In 1968 one 
Medal of Honor, six Navy Crosses, twenty-four Silver Stars, and seventy-eight Bronze 
Stars were awarded to members of Game Warden, many posthumously.  The PBR crews 
who transferred north to I Corps carried this unique sense of identity and duty with 
them.167  
                                                165	  Herman	  Hughes,	  phone	  interview	  by	  author,	  August	  30th,	  2011.	  166 W. C. Wells, “The Riverine Force in Action, 1966-1967,” Naval Review, 52.  167 James Lambert, “The History of the Brown Water Navy,” Jimmy Lambert 
Collection, Texas Tech Vietnam Archive, 6.  
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  A PBR river patrol was often a harrowing experience.  The boats’ fiberglass hulls 
and thin ceramic armor afforded little protection against mines or rockets.  Night patrols, 
instituted by Task Force Clearwater in April 1968, tested even the most veteran brown 
water sailor.  One officer who accompanied a PBR crew on a midnight patrol considered 
it, “the scariest experience I had in Vietnam.”168 Motoring forward at a few knots on a 
hostile river in darkness required a strong nerve, and to overcome this the PBR crews 
developed some of the deepest camaraderie seen in the Vietnam War.169  The tiny crews 
depended upon each other to an exceptional degree to return home alive.  Commander 
Sayre Schwartztrauber, one of the commodores170 of Task Force Clearwater later 
promoted to rear admiral described the men of the PBRs with pride, noting, “Their 
morale is the highest of any this writer has ever seen in the service,” and continued by 
noting that this was present despite miserable conditions, long hours and constant 
exposure to danger. Schwartztrauber concluded that, “These collective stimuli of great 
responsibility, hard work, discomfort, danger, and adventure, accompanied by selective 
personal assignment procedures, have developed a remarkably serious-minded and 
skillful corps of sailors with a keen sense of purpose.”171 
                                                168 Michael Taylor, telephone interview by author, August 5, 2011.   169 The unofficial motto of the PBR’s was “Proud, Brave, Reliable.” Another less known 
unofficial motto was “Paps Blue Ribbon,” a brand of beer popular with brown water 
sailors in Vietnam. Source: Tom Leiser, telephone interview by author, August 11, 2011. 170 In modern usage commodore denotes a title rather than a rank.  Most commodores 
are senior U.S Navy Captains who command a squadron or task force. The term is 
unofficial but used extensively by the modern U.S. Navy. 171 S. A. Swartztrauber, “River Patrol Relearned,” US Navy Institute Proceedings 96:5 
(May 1970), 383.  
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 Each PBR had a standard crew of four personnel: patrol boat captain (or 
coxswain), engineer, a gunner, and crewman.172  Though every crewmember was 
assigned an individual position each possessed interchangeable skills.  All PBR sailors 
were well qualified with the weapons and operating systems of the boat, a requirement 
that became useful in when the boat came under enemy fire.173  Often crewmembers had 
grab the controls when the coxswain was wounded.  Casualties were a fact of life on the 
rivers, and by 1970 one in three PBR sailors had been wounded in action.174 
 PBR patrols were often high on boredom, sweat, and fatigue.  Though shorter in 
comparison to the Delta, the daily sweep patrols along the northern rivers were full of 
long hours and high temperatures, but in most circumstances the crews’ morale remained 
good.  One PBR boat captain recalled that, “Guys sweat, get bored, and become 
grouchy, which is [to be] expected, but the majority seem to keep a cool head and 
perform efficiently.”175  Most PBR patrols would operate in pairs, with the lead boat 
sweeping ahead and the following boat providing cover from the rear.  On longer patrols 
the small confines of the boat were typically filled with ammunition, weapons, and 
                                                172 The boat captain was often a First Class petty officer, a senior mid-level enlisted 
rank.  173 The speed and armament of the PBR were its primary advantages in brown water 
warfare.  The PBR Mark II, an improved version of the craft introduced in 1967-68, had 
a speed of up to 28 knots and was usually armed with a twin .50 caliber machine gun 
mount forward, a single .50 caliber mount aft, a mounted Mark 18 grenade launcher, and 
several hand held M-79 grenade launchers, M-16 rifles, and a shotgun. Source: Thomas 
Mustin, “The River War,” Ordnance, no. 290 (September-October 1968), 176. 174 Schwartztrauber, “River Patrol Relearned,” 382. Note: As a testament to this over 
five hundred Purple Hearts were awarded to PBR sailors during the Vietnam War. 175 As quoted in Spector, At War at Sea, 362. 
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supplies.  Passengers such as U.S. Navy SEAL teams, South Vietnamese sailors, or an 
interpreter also often crowded onboard the thirty-one foot boat.176  
 As the river war progressed more and more junior sailors were called upon to 
take on leadership roles, a situation that many relished.  The opportunity to be in charge 
of the boat carried a powerful responsibility, and while the traditional hierarchical 
structure of the tradition minded blue water navy was less evident the average brown 
water sailors shared the desire for command.  One brown water engineer provided a 
particularly apt summary of what it meant to be in charge on a PBR, observing that, “As 
patrol officer if you’re out on [river patrol] you made the decision and decided whether 
those people were going to be alive or dead in the next two minutes.”177 
 Not all missions involved lethal combat or dull patrols.  Some of the most 
memorable work done on the northern rivers was humanitarian in nature.  The Medical 
Civic Action Program (MEDCAP), an effort to provide medical and dental care to South 
Vietnamese civilians, was instituted along the northern rivers towards the close of 1968. 
MEDCAP (see Figure 14) had been one of the more successful humanitarian campaigns 
of the war, and the arrival of U.S. Navy doctors and corpsmen was eagerly awaited 
along the rivers and tributaries.  Richard Schreadley, who accompanied Navy personnel 
on several MEDCAP missions in I Corps, recalled, “vividly the lines of people, mostly 
women, children, and old men, waiting patiently to see a doctor, a dentist, a nurse, or as 
was most often the case, a navy corpsmen.”178  In November two PBRs from Cua Viet 
                                                176 Thomas Mustin, “The River War,” Ordnance 53, no. 290 (September-October 1968), 
176. 177 As quoted in Spector, At War at Sea, 362. 178 As quoted in Richard L. Schreadley, From the Rivers to the Sea, 252. 
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ferried three Navy corpsmen and two nurses to the village of Long Kim.  During the visit 
the medical personnel treated over two hundred Vietnamese civilians and distributed 
three hundred bars of soap.  The official report of the visit ended, “People seem to 
appreciate MEDCAP’s very much.”179  
 The lower level of enemy activity on the Perfume River after the Tet Offensive 
gave the Hue river group more time and resources to perform a variety of humanitarian 
and psychological missions than was available to naval operations elsewhere.  In the 
aftermath of the massacre of civilians during the battle for Hue several initiatives were 
enacted to gain trust among the local population, and one of the most effective was the 
adoption of a powerful emblem.  The dragon symbolized strength and honor to the 
tradition minded population of Hue, and consequently the PBRs began to fly a dragon 
headed flag on patrols.  The South Vietnamese soon dubbed them Tau Rong or Dragon 
Boats.  Combined with the MEDCAP and other aid programs these initiatives improve 
cooperation and mutual trust considerably.180 
                                                179 (CTF Opsum) 030440Z NOV 1968. 180 Cutler, Brown Water, Black Berets, 279-280. 
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Figure 14. MEDCAP Inspection. Captain Shaw (center), Task Force Clearwater 
commander, accompanying a MEDCAP team at a South Vietnamese village along the 
Cua Viet River, April-May 1968. Photo courtesy Herman Hughes. 
 
 The crowded rivers sometimes called for one of the most ancient of maritime 
traditions, coming to those in aid.  U.S. Navy craft were far from the only boats to transit 
the Cua Viet and Perfume Rivers. The northern waterways were crowded with all 
manner of watercraft, and on more than one occasion PBR sailors responded to assist a 
sampan in distress.  The traditional Vietnamese craft were often in poor condition and 
barely seaworthy, and on a few unfortunate occasions the presence of the brown water 
boats was the indirect cause of a tragedy.  One such example occurred on the morning of 
March 10th, 1968 when a sampan ferrying refugees on the Cua Viet River capsized.  The 
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dangerously overloaded craft overturned after narrowly missing a nearby PBR.  Twenty-
five to thirty Vietnamese were thrown into the river by the PBR’s wake and 
subsequently rescued from the water by Navy personnel.  Three passengers of the 
sampan drowned, however, but the quick response of the PBR crews was greatly 
appreciated by the survivors.181              
  
Mine Warfare 
 With little to work with PBR crews often found innovative ways to mitigate the 
vulnerability of their boats.  One such approach was to redesign the forward gunner’s 
chair.  After removing the standard metal chair boat engineers would install a lighter 
version fitted with four reinforced metal springs.  A Navy brown water supply officer 
described the purpose of the modified seat, recalling that, “What would happen is if a 
PBR did hit a mine the bow gunner was the one that was most likely to be killed or 
injured.” The new seat made for a bumpy ride for the forward gunner but helped ensure 
that a mine detonation “wouldn’t break his back or compress his spine.”182     
 The naval mine threat, long present on the northern rivers, changed considerably 
after the Tet Offensive.  Following their failure to effectively close the rivers during the 
offensive—coupled with their defeat at Hue— the NVA and Viet Cong were left with 
limited options to stem the flow of logistical supplies to American positions situated 
inland from coastal supply depots.  With greater manpower available from the 3rd 
Marine Division and improved river patrols the riverbanks of both the northern 
                                                181 (CTF Opsum) 120130Z MAY 1968. 182 Edwin Oswald, interview by Laura Calkins, April 30th, 2004, transcript, Texas Tech 
University Vietnam Archive, Oral History Collection, 98-99. 
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waterways became increasingly inhospitable for PAVN personnel.  Consequently 
underwater weapons became the greatest threat to the brown water navy in I Corps.  
Like convoys of later wars that dealt with hidden explosive devices on desert roads, the 
sailors of Clearwater encountered a diverse variety of concealed waterborne hazards.    
 Proximity to the DMZ made the Cua Viet River the most accessible to PAVN 
mine laying teams.  U.S. and ARVN air and naval surveillance and ground patrols along 
the Perfume River, coupled with improved military-civilian cooperation led PAVN 
forces to concentrate their efforts elsewhere.  As a result the more northern waterway 
became the most heavily mined waterway in South Vietnam. The seriousness of the new 
mining offensive on the Cua Viet became apparent soon after the siege of Khe Sanh 
ended.  Destruction of an ATC by a large contact mine on March 14th, was followed by 
six weeks of relative calm, but this interlude did not last.  
 On the second day of May the sailors of Clearwater discovered that the contact 
mines encountered previously had been superseded by more dangerous versions.183  
While on patrol, two PBRs spotted a large group of NVA on the north side of the Cua 
Viet as well as several large cylindrical objects at the water’s edge. Opening fire on the 
targets, the PBR killed a number of the suspected NVA soldiers were killed and 
destroyed the mines.  During the next few days U.S. Navy EOD (Explosive Ordnance 
                                                183 Though classifications vary widely, naval mines are often categorized by their 
method of detonation or their location in the water.  The most common detonator types 
are contact, magnetic or influence, or command detonated. Contact mines explode when 
struck by a large object, while magnetic or influence mines possess a sensor set to 
detonate when the presence of a large metal object passes nearby. Command detonated 
mines are set off by a radio signal, often replaced by cell phones today. Location 
categories can be classified into moored, bottom, or floating mines.  On the Cua Viet 
River nearly all of these categories of mines were encountered.    
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Disposal) teams recovered several of the mines intact.  They proved to be advanced 
magnetic mines of Soviet origin, weighing an estimated eighty hundred and fifty pounds 
each, powerful enough to “sink a battleship,” in the words of one U.S. intelligence 
officer.184  An NVA operative from among the group captured on May 2nd later admitted 
under interrogation that he was part of a four-man team trained specifically in the use of 
the magnetic mines.  He described how the mines were broken down into components 
north of the DMZ, man packed south to the river’s edge under cover of darkness, and 
then reassembled.185  The teams would then attach flotation bladders to the large mines 
and deploy them into the river, for the explicit purpose of impeding the flow of logistics 
traffic from Danang.186 
 Another NVA operative captured in early 1969 provided far greater details on 
these mine-laying teams.  All carefully screened Communist party members, the teams 
received over five months of intensive training in North Vietnam on how to operate, 
transport, and plant the mines.  Using four man teams, they would drag a handful of the 
large mines south from the DMZ at night.  After lying in wait for Clearwater patrols to 
pass, they would float the mines out into the river then conceal themselves in hidden 
bunkers until darkness and walk back to the DMZ.187    
 These sophisticated magnetic mines were supplemented with a wide variety of 
improvised waterborne explosives, making the task of identifying a deadly mine from 
harmless flotsam difficult. Almost any buoyant object was potentially dangerous.  In his 
                                                184	  The	  exact	  classification	  of	  these	  mines	  was	  the	  Soviet	  H18-­‐2	  anti-­‐ship	  mine.	  185	  Herman	  Hughes, phone interview by author, August 31st, 2011.	  	  186 MACV Command History, 453. 187 Schreadley, From the Rivers to the Sea, 246-47. 
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history of the brown water Navy Richard Schreadley noted that on the Cua Viet, 
”Floating objects, regardless of their innocent appearance, had to be treated with the 
utmost caution.  C-Ration boxes, tree limbs, cans, drums, plastic spheres and fish floats, 
a bright blue swim fin, and other flotsam and jetsam of no particular distinction – all 
might conceal or buoy a floating mine.”  Many of these floating objects were destroyed 
by rifle fire from a PBR, which sometimes resulted in a large explosion that often shook 
the fiberglass craft to its core.  Though none was sunk during the month of May six 
separate logistics craft suffered damage from mines.188     
 The North Vietnamese soon added to their arsenal of weapons by including 
swimmers trained in the use of underwater explosives such as limpet mines.189  The 
addition of these sappers made July an especially difficult month.  The worst day of the 
month, July 27th, signaled an escalation in the North’s campaign to disrupt the river 
traffic to Dong Ha.  On that day coordinated sapper attacks disabled three LCM craft 
moored to a buoy near the Cua Viet base.  Though all three of the damaged logistics 
craft were recovered with only a single human casualty, the attack demonstrated the 
growing capability of the PAVN sapper teams.  Like the specially trained river mine 
teams they received detailed preparation for their missions, and as the months continued 
so did their attempts to halt the river logistics traffic.190 
 To counter the mine threat Task Force Clearwater began daily sweeps of the Cua 
Viet.  PBRs on patrol searched for suspicious floating objects and the LCMs modified 
                                                188 Ibid., 246. 189 The limpet mine is a general name for a small underwater mine, usually a chemical 
charge attached to a ship or boat with magnets.  190 MACV News Release, July 29th, 1968: Saigon, South Vietnam, 2. 
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for minesweeping used chain sweeps to cut moored mines.  When located the EOD 
teams would be summoned to dispose of larger floating mines or anything the brown 
water sailors refused to touch.  Other minesweeping boats were also equipped with 
magnetic sweeping gear that could locate and disable the especially dangerous influence 
mines.  A message summarizing the mine countermeasures employed on the northern 
river noted that beyond the use of the magnetic sweep gear, “chain drag sweeping, bank 
security, and vigilant river patrols remain the only effective response to these continuing 
threats.”191                       
 
“Little Better than Moles” 
 Dangerous and unpleasant as they regularly were, the minesweeping patrols were 
often preferable to life at the home base of the Dong Ha River Group.  At the close of 
1968 NSAD Cua Viet resembled a turn of the century border town of dilapidated 
cantonments, bereft of any organizing principle or layout.192  Occupying the north edge 
of a small peninsula that jutted into the Gulf of Tonkin, Cua Viet consisted of a few 
dozen wooden and prefabricated buildings connected by wooden walkways, to permit 
passage on the deep and ever shifting sand.  Nothing was built beyond the most essential 
structures due to the danger of artillery bombardment from the north.193  Around a dozen 
PBRs, ATCs, and assorted logistics craft were typically tied up just north of the beach, 
                                                191 (CTF Opsum) 171500Z May 1968. 192 The best photographs of Cua Viet can be found in Edward M. Marolda’s The U.S. 
Navy in the Vietnam War: An Illustrated History (Washington, DC: Brassey’s Inc, 
2002); Frank Collins “Maritime Support of the Campaign in I Corps,” in Vietnam:  The 
Naval Story, ed. by Frank Uhlig (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1986). 193 Schwartztrauber, “River Patrol Relearned,” 377. 
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alongside temporary piers.  Forced to endure regular artillery attacks most buildings had 
been built deep into the sand and fortified with countless bags of the readily available 
material.  The conditions at the base caused naval historian Richard Schreadley to 
remark, “The men at Cua Viet lived little better than moles in heavily bunkered huts 
burrowed down among the sand dunes.”194  
 Life at the exposed location was harsh.  The sand blasted barracks were the 
embodiment of austerity, and few diversions existed other than playing cards or 
discussing the last patrol in the mess hall, where as a precaution most inhabitants of Cua 
Viet took their meals wearing their helmets and flak jackets.195  One of the most telling 
accounts of life at the detachment can be found in a letter from a junior naval officer to 
his inbound relief.  The letter began with some humorous advice, noting, “The best way 
to prepare for coming to Cua Viet is to go to Canada.”196  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                194 Richard L. Schreadley, “The Naval War in Vietnam, 1950-1970,” 293. 195 Cutler, Brown Water, Black Berets, 272. 196	  Michael W. Taylor, A Reminiscence of One Year’s Service as a United States Naval 
Officer in South Vietnam, 1970-1971, Michael Taylor Collection, Texas Tech University 
Vietnam Archive,7-9. 	  
84 
 
 
 He went on to describe the harsh conditions such as “a hell of a lot of beautiful 
shifting, blowing white sand,” the lousy climate, and the poorly aimed but still 
dangerous rocket attacks from the north, make living here a “pain in the a___.”  Despite 
the hardships he also wrote fondly of his fellow sailors and Marines, noting, “There is a 
correspondingly greater camaraderie among the officers and men.  If something has to 
be done, it’s easy to find the right person.” He recommended bringing plenty of books, 
and then ended the letter abruptly with, “When the h__l are you getting here?”197 
 Cua Viet was unusual not only for its unforgiving location but also for its shared 
joint command responsibilities and personnel.  Over a dozen separate units were present, 
including Army and Marine Corps security platoons, an Army signal detachment, and a 
Marine searchlight platoon.198  Intra-service rivalries over defense of the base were a 
constant source of tension, and these frustrations as well as anger about the living 
conditions and the war itself occasionally spilled over leading to occasional acts of 
vandalism and sabotage. The struggle to maintain morale was a constant one.  After a 
visit to Cua Viet in 1969 Richard Schreadley noted that, “One can well imagine how 
these circumstances affected not only the tradition-bound senior officers at the base, but 
the large majority of men there who were trying to do a job to the best of their 
ability.”199     
 
                                                197 Ibid., 7-9.  198 Schwartztrauber, “River Patrol Relearned,” 376. 199 Richard L. Schreadley, From the Rivers to the Sea, 244. 
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Figure 15. Cua Viet Base Barracks. Photo courtesy of Herman Hughes 
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Figure 16. Artillery Damage to Cua Viet Barracks.  Captain Shaw, Commander of Task 
Force Clearwater, inspects damage to his office, March-April 1968. Photo courtesy of 
Herman Hughes. 
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 Cua Viet became a byword for the toughest possible living conditions in the 
brown water navy.  Sailors in the Delta often heard horror stories of the base, which was 
often compared to survival among the trenches of Verdun or Passchendaele (see Figure 
15).  The barbed wire emplacements, regular artillery attacks, and barracks covered by 
sandbags did much to reinforce the view that Cua Viet was one of the worst places to be 
assigned in all of South Vietnam.200  Most destructive were the irregular artillery 
bombardments, a persistent nuisance (Figure 16).  Periodically North Vietnamese 
artillery pieces would lob inaccurate but destructive rounds onto Cua Viet.  Admittedly 
none of these bombardments equaled the destructiveness of March 10th, 1968, when 
almost half the base was destroyed, including the mess hall, communications bunker, 
and sickbay.201  This attack made clear both the vulnerability of the base and the 
irregular nature of the North’s long-range artillery capabilities.  Following a March B-52 
Arclight strike that devastated their positions inside the DMZ, the North Vietnamese 
were forced to move their weapons further north, outside effective range of Cua Viet.  
Any round that did hit the base could be attributed to pure chance.202 
                                                200 Michael Taylor, telephone interview by author, August 5, 2011.   201 (CTF Opsum) 231315Z APR 1968. 202 In an interesting account from then Lieutenant Herman Hughes, U.S. Navy, who 
served as intelligence officer at Cua Viet from March through May 1968, the 
COMNAVFORV staff members were skeptical that the NVA had artillery pieces in the 
ostensibly ‘demilitarized’ DMZ.  After discovering an unexploded 152mm artillery shell 
one morning after a bombardment, Hughes had an EOD team detonate the shell then 
pieced back the fragments “like a puzzle.”  Along with an assistant he transported the 
heavy shell fragments back to COMNAVFORV headquarters in Saigon, and in his 
words, “I walked in and plunked that thing down on the intelligence officer’s desk and 
said, ‘That’s what they’re hitting us with.’” The shell fragments had the desired effect, as 
a week later the B-52 strikes were launched on the DMZ artillery positions. Source: 
Herman Hughes, phone interview by author, August 30th, 2011.	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 The majority of post-Tet Offensive bombardments lasted less than an hour with a 
few dozen rounds impacting on or around the base, inflicting little physical damage but 
extracting a significant psychological toll.  One of the heaviest bombardments took place 
on the morning of May 25th, when over a hundred rounds landed in close proximity to 
Cua Viet, resulting in negligible damage and no casualties.203  During the first three 
weeks of June, six separate attacks occurred, with most of the damage confined to the 
base fuel farm.  A summary message noted that by that time the NVA artillerymen had 
developed improved techniques to direct their fire, possibly employing a spotter on the 
north side of the river, noting, “During each attack the initial barrage consisted of four to 
six rounds which landed both long and short of the target.  After a short pause a steady 
barrage was received with increasing accuracy.”  On June 24th sailors and Marines again 
rushed to their sandy bunkers to ride out another bombardment.  This time, however, 
almost half of the North Vietnamese rounds failed to explode, leaving dozens of half-
buried shells in the sandy hills surrounding the base, later disposed of by ordnance 
disposal teams.  The bombardments subsided in the fall of 1968 but memories of the 
exploding shells remained long after the guns had fallen silent.204 
 Aside from the stress and exploding ordnance another nuisance was the presence 
of a female radio personality heard around the base.  A North Vietnamese version of 
Tokyo Rose, the American dubbed Hanoi Hannah made regular propaganda broadcasts 
predicting the imminent defeat of U.S. and ARVN ‘puppet’ forces.  On occasion she 
singled out the Cua Viet base, especially its singularly unfortunate mess hall.  Over the 
                                                203 COMNAVFORV Monthly Historical Summary, May 1968, 77. 204 (CTF Opsum) 240440Z JUN 68. 
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course of its existence the base endured the loss and subsequent reconstruction of 
numerous mess halls, each destroyed by uncannily accurate NVA artillery fire.  On July 
6th, 1968 the crews of Cua Viet enjoyed a rare dinner of steak and lobster tails, the, 
“finest cuisine in northern I CTZ  - in spite of Hanoi Hannah’s recent radio 
pronouncement to the men at Cua Viet that they would never get to eat a meal in the 
mess hall being constructed.”205  A few months after this feast, however, this fourth mess 
hall to be built was destroyed by another direct hit.  Quickly rebuilt, the fifth mess hall 
was named in honor of a cook killed inside, the structure’s only casualty.206 
 Conditions at Tan My were quite different.  Since its short-lived establishment as 
the headquarters of Task Force Clearwater in February 1968 the primary base of the Hue 
river group had become an enviable place to work.  With some creative engineering an 
LCM was modified to transport PBRs from Cua Viet to Mobile Base I, the artificial 
island of Ammi barges in place at Tan My.207  By the end of 1968 only twenty PBRs 
were available in I Corps, and keeping the boats operational was a high priority.208  
Mobile Base I had advantages beyond its repair facilities, however.  The ‘temporary’ 
floating base and headquarters of the Hue River security group was considered one of 
the best places to pull duty in I Corps, described by one observer as,  “air conditioned, 
clean, and for the most part run like a taut navy ship.”  With the exception of the 
                                                205 (CTF Opsum) 061400Z JUL 68. 206 Thomas J. Cutler, Brown Water, Black Berets, 271.  207 Schwartztrauber, “River Patrol Relearned,” 376.  208 MACV Historical Summary, 463. 
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occasional mortar or sapper attack Tan My was also far safer than its counterpart to the 
northwest.209      
 The unforgiving conditions at Cua Viet eventually compelled TFCW leadership 
to consider seriously a regular crew rotation system for the base.  These concerns were 
spelled out in a message from River Flotilla Five in October 1968, and explained that 
the, “Rationale behind rotation plan is principally founded in austere and primitive living 
conditions at Cua Viet, and constant threat of in-coming artillery, both on patrol and at 
the base, the constant strain, high temperature, and lack of creature comforts make it 
necessary to ease the pressure on these men.”  The message recommended that all brown 
water personnel be rotated out every six months to limit the stress of duty at Cua Viet.210 
Yet often this opportunity to escape was turned down, as many sailors chose to remain at 
the base and finish their full tour.211 
 The dangers and privations shared by the sailors, soldiers, and Marines who 
served in Task Force Clearwater led to the development of a unique brown water culture. 
Duty on both the Cua Viet and Perfume Rivers brought a deep sense of élan to the men 
who patrolled their muddy waters.  Commodore Schwartztrauber offered perhaps the 
most fitting summary to these sailors, declaring that, “Merely to serve with these units, is 
to be greatly impressed with the men’s qualities of ingenuity, courage, professional skill, 
and patriotic dedication to duty.”  Courageous and dedicated personnel, not boats or 
organization, were what defined this unique group.212      
                                                209 Schreadley, From the Rivers to the Sea, 250. 210 Commander River Patrol Flotilla Five Message 110621Z OCT 1968. 211 Schreadley, “The Naval War in Vietnam, 1950-1970,” 293. 212 As quoted in Schwartztrauber, “River Patrol Relearned,” 377-78.	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CHAPTER IV 
 
THE SLOW DRAW DOWN 
 
“In the previous administration we Americanized the war in Viet-Nam.  In this 
administration we are Vietnamizing the search for peace.” 
Richard M. Nixon, November 3, 1969 
 
 
 From their vantage point the politics of the Vietnam War may have seemed 
remote to the men of Task Force Clearwater, but in the summer and fall of 1968 they 
began to exert a powerful influence.  Events both near and far would cast a long shadow 
on their operations.  Racial and political tensions back home in the United States were at 
a boiling point.  The aftermath of the Tet Offensive heralded increasing national 
disillusionment with the long war, visceral anger directed at the political establishment 
and social upheavals at home.  In their sometimes forgotten corner of South Vietnam the 
brown water sailors would hear of the assassinations of Martin Luther King, Jr., and 
Robert Kennedy, fierce protests against the war, and an upsurge in violence which would 
cause one of the most respected scholars on Vietnam to observe that, “Rioting in the 
cities, a spiraling crime rate, and noisy demonstrations in the streets suggested that 
violence abroad had produced violence at home.”213   
 A series of upheavals in military and political leadership also took place. For 
their 37th Commander-in-Chief the United States would elect a former vice-president 
who campaigned on the promise of “peace with honor.”214  General Creighton Abrams 
                                                213 George C. Herring, America’s Longest War:  The United States and Vietnam, 1950-
1975 (New York:  McGraw-Hill, 2002), 213.  214 Republican Party candidate Richard M. Nixon would be elected President of the 
United States on November 5th, 1968, beating out Democratic Party nominee Hubert 
Humphrey.  
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had succeeded General William Westmoreland as the MACV commander in June of 
1968 and was assigned the colossal task of turning the defense of embattled South 
Vietnam over to its own citizens.  Most importantly, the brown water sailors of I Corps 
soon found themselves under the command of a new and dynamic leader, who would 
later become one of the most influential U.S. naval officers of the 20th century. 
 
Enter Elmo Zumwalt    
 On the last day of September 1968, Rear Admiral Kenneth Veth, who had served 
as Commander Naval Forces, Vietnam, since April 1967, was relieved of command by 
Vice Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt.215  In many ways the elevation of Admiral Zumwalt led 
to the greatest operational and administrative shift of America’s Southeast Asia naval 
strategy since the creation of Operation Market Time in 1965.  The youngest vice-
admiral in U.S. Navy history in 1968, he was considered one of the service’s most 
capable leaders.216  Unorthodox and controversial, he devoted his considerable energies 
to the development of new strategies and tactics for the brown water navy in South 
Vietnam.  In short he came to win.217      
 This aggressive approach set him apart from his predecessor. Though in many 
ways an outstanding officer, Rear Admiral Veth never seemed comfortable with his role 
                                                215 Commander U.S. Naval Forces Vietnam News Release, Saigon: September 30th, 
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as COMNAVFORV or in the world of brown water warfare.  Described by a junior 
member of his staff as “a real gentlemen,” Veth was perhaps too conservative for the 
unconventional and demanding war in Vietnam.218  Even those who appreciated his 
traditional leadership style described him as defensively oriented and “totally 
unaggressive.”219   
 Admiral Veth had a poor working relationship with the General Abrams, a 
serious impediment to intra-service cooperation.  During Zumwalt’s first meeting with 
General Abrams in Saigon Veth was all but ignored by the MACV commander, who by 
most accounts was eager for his departure from the country.220 Yet for all his faults Veth 
was partly the victim of the Navy’s fixation with the expanding Soviet Navy, and on 
more than one occasion his passivity gave way to decisive action.  His quick response to 
the Tet Offensive in I Corps deserves commendation. Without his initiative Task Force 
Clearwater would not have been created during the crisis weeks of February 1968. 
 Another of Veth’s shortcomings was his tendency to manage the naval war 
primarily from his headquarters in Saigon.  The tradition bound officer rarely ventured 
to his subordinate commands.  In marked contrast soon after his arrival in Saigon 
Admiral Zumwalt conducted a whirlwind inspection of nearly every major naval 
installation, including Danang, Cua Viet, and Tan My.  Along with members of his staff 
he even spent one night in a muddy bunker near the Cua Viet base, learning firsthand 
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Elmo Zumwalt Oral History Collection, Texas Tech University Vietnam Archive, 4.  219 Earl Rectanus, interview by Paul Stillwell, November 19th, 1982, interview 1, 
transcript, Elmo Zumwalt Oral History Collection, Texas Tech University Vietnam 
Archive, 14. 
220 Leslie Julian Cullen, “Brown Water Admiral,” 67. 
94 
 
from the Marines what conditions on the DMZ truly were.221 The admiral’s good rapport 
with sailors, especially those in the brown water fleet, soon earned him a deep measure 
of trust and admiration, as well as the nickname the “Sailor’s Admiral.”  Following his 
tour Zumwalt’s efforts were soon fixed on reemphasizing the U.S. Navy’s original 
mission, preventing sea-borne infiltration into South Vietnam.  To this end he soon 
launched a series of aggressive brown water operations in the Mekong Delta, including 
his centerpiece effort, Operation SEALORDS.222 
 SEALORDS (Southeast Asia Lake, Ocean, River, and Delta Strategy) 
represented the operational embodiment of Zumwalt’s command style and creativity.  
Realizing that the 38,000 personnel and hundreds of river craft under his command were 
simultaneously at the peak of their strength but also underutilized, he advocated an 
audacious new strategy that would play to their strengths.  This new plan would employ 
over five hundred U.S. Navy brown water vessels from all three of the major maritime 
task forces (Market Time, Game Warden, and the Mobile Riverine Force), six hundred 
VNN patrol boats, and aerial support to establish a series of river barriers as part of a 
powerful interdiction line in the Mekong Delta.  For the first time these previously 
separate task forces would operate jointly as a single team, the newly created Task Force 
194.  Once the barriers were in place in January 1969 the effort led to a series of blows 
against the Viet Cong and a sharp decrease in communist infiltration in comparison to 
previous years.223  Of his innovative plan Zumwalt argued simply that brown water 
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warfare required inherent flexibility and that, “You must change strategies frequently in 
order to keep the enemy from exploiting you.”224     
 Admiral Zumwalt was the leader that the brown water navy in Vietnam had been 
waiting for, an innovative strategist who was unafraid to jettison old ideas. The admiral’s 
energetic leadership was a jolt to nearly all levels of the Vietnam brown water navy, and 
his creative approach in IV Corps was undoubtedly effective.  One analysis of Operation 
SEALORDS concluded that, “By concentrating naval forces athwart the major 
infiltration routes along the Cambodian border, SEALORDS effectively cut enemy 
communication lines into South Vietnam and severely restricted enemy attempts at 
infiltration.”225  Yet one key brown water task force would be largely left out of this 
resurgence.  With the majority of his time and resources devoted towards the Mekong 
Delta the new COMNAVFORV could spare little for his tiny brown water flotilla in I 
Corps.  As it had since its inception, Task Force Clearwater would continue to fulfill its 
multitude of responsibilities with both distinction and steadily dwindling resources. 
   
An Ever Evolving Mission 
 At the close of April 1968, as a prelude to their larger countrywide ‘mini-Tet’ 
offensive in May, Quang Tri province was the site of a large and little understood battle 
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whose exact purpose continues to puzzle scholars.226  Like Khe Sanh the original 
intentions of the North Vietnamese remain obscure, though some historians consider the 
battle a poorly executed attempt to capture Dong Ha.227  For years military historians 
could not even give the enigmatic battle a proper title, and in the words of historian 
Ronald Spector, “It long remained a battle with no name.”228   
 The battle of Dai Do, named years later for a tiny village along the Bo Dieu 
tributary to Dong Ha, began with a rocket attack on an LCU headed upriver on April 
30th, 1968.  This act forced the temporary closure of the Cua Viet River and alerted the 
3rd Marines to the presence of the North Vietnamese 320th Division, entrenched near the 
village of Dai Do.  For much of the next month several battalions of Marines would 
engage in vicious fighting north of Dong Ha, eventually pushing the North Vietnamese 
out of an impressive line of fortifications and preventing a potential takeover of the hub 
of their logistics network in I Corps.  During the course of the “confused and bloody” 
battle, by some estimates the largest single engagement of the war, the men and boats of 
Task Force Clearwater played a peripheral role.  The monitors provided fire support and 
                                                226 Mini-Tet, or the May Offensive, as military historians have named it, was the third 
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the patrol craft to guard the logistics traffic, but the overwhelming brunt of the fighting 
was borne by the outnumbered Marines, who suffered 1,500 casualties compared to over 
3,000 North Vietnamese killed or captured.  Though not an enormous tactical victory for 
the U.S., the battle’s strategic result was to leave the eastern half of the DMZ under 
American control for the first time since 1965.229 
  
 
Figure 17. LT Hughes Inspecting NVA Sapper Gear. Photo courtesy Herman Hughes. 
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 The exact objective of the NVA offensive has never been made clear, but by 
piecing together some of the more disparate pieces of evidence a plausible answer 
emerges to this riddle.  During the early morning hours of May 2nd a PBR patrol east of 
Dong Ha encountered a large group of heavily equipped NVA infantrymen on the 
northern riverbank, including five suspected sappers.230  The group was immediately 
taken under fire and what was estimated to be a large mine destroyed.  During the next 
few days several more mines were found and recovered by U.S. Navy EOD teams, 
apparently abandoned by NVA sapper teams. As mentioned in the previous chapter, 
these were a set of six complete Soviet H18-2 magnetic mines, the most sophisticated 
yet encountered in I Corps, and deployed by mine laying team specially trained in North 
Vietnam (see Figure 17).   
 Captured a few days after the recovery of the Soviet mines, a North Vietnamese 
sailor revealed under interrogation that the mines were part of a larger combined 
strategy.  He detailed a plan in which a few days prior to a communist assault on Dong 
Ha his team was to place the magnetic mines in the Cua Viet River, in the hopes of 
sinking several of the LCM and YFU craft transiting to Dong Ha.  The theory was that if 
enough of the larger logistics craft were sunk and both sides of the river captured, the 
waterway would be blocked to all traffic, limiting reinforcements from Cua Viet and 
permitting the NVA division to capture Dong Ha with limited interference.231 
 This bold plan never reached fruition, in large part due to the alert reaction of the 
PBR crews.  In a phone interview Herman Hughes, an intelligence officer assigned to 
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Cua Viet, he acknowledged the debt the Marines owed to the brown water navy, 
recalling that the PBR sailors, “discovered what the North Vietnamese were wanting to 
do, and would have done had we not took them under fire in the middle of the night.”232 
The NVA plan was unlikely to succeed, yet it was certainly plausible, and even a brief 
disruption to the supply routes in I Corps could have been troubling, if not disastrous. 
The fall of Dong Ha would have been even more problematic.  In After Tet, Ronald 
Spector speculates that, “The seizure of Dong Ha, even for a few days, would have been 
a major psychological victory similar to Hue or the attack on the U.S. Embassy during 
Tet.”233      
 The months following this successful defense of I Corps brought both a decrease 
in the level of fighting and significant changes to Task Force Clearwater.  From its 
beginnings as an improvised command Clearwater had quickly matured into a small but 
capable task force.  The high water mark of Clearwater’s operations on the northern 
rivers was undoubtedly the late spring and early summer of 1968.  With the failure of the 
May Offensive the threat to Dong Ha and the whole of I Corps diminished considerably, 
and as the summer of 1968 progressed the reach of the task force was extended into the 
tributaries of both rivers and the surrounding lagoons and bays in I Corps.234  Although 
the logistics craft from Danang continued to attract mine and rocket attacks the task 
force had established a measure of positive control over the waterways.   
 With only a fraction of the resources available to Operation Game Warden the 
northern task force’s small fleet began performing joint operations with both the Marines 
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and 101st Airborne Division.  Psychological operations to dissuade Viet Cong infiltration 
as well as the ever-popular MEDCAP missions became more common.  At the same 
time the task force’s most unusual craft were used with spectacular success in the bays 
and lagoons surrounding Hue.  Capitalizing on their speed the PACVs were often used to 
cut off the escape routes of Viet Cong units fleeing from the American paratroopers.  
Their unique ability to operate on both land and sea enabled the killing or capture of 
dozens of Viet Cong personnel, more than making up for their high price in both 
maintenance hours and operating costs.235        
 The summer of 1968 would mark the peak of the Clearwater’s operations.  The 
arrival of the PACVs and an increase in the number of available PBRs enabled the task 
force to move beyond the defensive missions of logistical escort and river patrol.  This 
apex in operational strength proved short lived, however.  Though the hovercraft did 
mark an uptick in available boats this increased strength was misleading. Mechanically 
demanding, the hovercraft became more and more troublesome as time passed, and as 
their psychological shock value gradually diminished the large craft became conspicuous 
targets.  By the summer of 1969 the aging craft would be retired and shipped back to the 
United States.236   
 By this time the threat to the logistics traffic had eased and the majority of I 
Corps was firmly in U.S. and ARVN hands. This new situation meant that that the task 
force was not the priority it had once been.  Operationally preoccupied with his 
offensives in the Mekong Delta, Admiral Zumwalt’s priorities lay elsewhere.  This focus 
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on IV Corps is understandable, since during the months following the battle of Dai Do 
and the subsequent May Offensive the communists turned their attention to other targets 
in South Vietnam.  After months of hazardous patrols the task force had partially 
achieved its objectives.  Both of the northern rivers had become more secure arteries of 
transportation, and supplies flowed largely unimpeded to Hue and Dong Ha.  Rocket 
attacks on the traffic transiting to Hue or Dong Ha occasionally broke the calm of I 
Corps waterways but they were infrequent, and the artillery bombardments on Cua Viet 
base were more infrequent and ineffectual.  Though they remained geographically at the 
North Vietnamese doorstep, the rivers of I Corps had become a backwater of the war. 
 Despite the decrease in enemy activity the mine threat remained very real, as did 
the casualties.  On January 16th, 1969 the first major tragedy of the year occurred, when 
a YFU logistics craft transiting to Dong Ha sunk after striking a large mine. Five sailors 
were killed and four others were wounded.237 At the close of January a conference to 
discuss the mine threat met in Danang, attended by the commander of Task Force 
Clearwater, Captain Sayre Schwartztrauber, and the base’s commander, Rear Admiral 
Emmett P. Bonner.  The conference concluded that the primary threat would continue to 
come from contact detonated mines, and recommended that additional mine sweeping 
resources be made available to the Dong Ha River Group. Over time three fifty-seven 
foot fiberglass hulled MSBs (Mine Sweeping Boats) from Mine Division 112 were 
detached from Danang to assist the task force.  A request to the Seventh Fleet for more 
effective MSL (Minesweeping Launch) boats was denied, as they were deemed too 
valuable to risk in the dangerous Cua Viet River.  As the river remained the most heavily 
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mined waterway in South Vietnam this decision likely resulted in more than a few angry 
voices of protest, but even so the task force continued to operate with the limited 
available resources.238    
 While resources to combat the mine offensive remained limited, Naval Forces 
Vietnam leadership did recognize the need for command personnel with greater 
expertise in this neglected component of naval warfare.  Subsequently Captain Frederick 
Jewett II, a specialist in mine warfare, was chosen to relieve the popular and effective 
Captain Schwartztrauber in February 1969.  At the time of his accession to command 
Jewett had available nine converted LCM-6 minesweepers, four on the Perfume River 
and five on the Cua Viet.  The LCMs were an enlarged version of the classic Higgins 
boat of the Second World War.  Slightly smaller than the more common LCM-8 “Mike” 
boats used so effectively on the northern rivers, the craft were designated MSM 
(Minesweeper, River) after their conversion, which simply involved the installation of 
sweep gear towed from the stern of the craft.   Three of the more specialized MSBs were 
assigned to the north in early 1969, for the express purpose of sweeping the mouth of the 
Cua Viet River.239        
 Based on an assessment of the mines encountered to that time, Jewett made 
several improvements to the sweep gear being used by the MSMs.240  Like his 
predecessor the Clearwater commodore improvised to protect both his own boats and the 
river traffic from Danang.  When American supplies of concussion grenades ran low he 
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ordered his supply officer to obtain a shipment of a British version of the explosive, one 
that worked quite effectively on the innovative but still primitive mines on the Cua Viet 
River.241 
 By the time of Jewett’s tenure as commodore, minesweeping on the Cua Viet had 
become a daily routine.  Typically a twenty foot Boston whaler (chosen for its non-metal 
construction) would depart Cua Viet and drop the British made ‘scare’ charges at high 
speed, hoping to destroy the less sophisticated contact or ‘basket’ mines that floated just 
below the surface.  After completing their high speed run the whaler was followed by the 
MSMs towing their river mine sweep gear, hoping to locate and disable any influence or 
magnetic mines unaffected by the charges dropped by the whaler.  Piloting an MSM 
down the mine-infested river required an iron nerve, as their pilots knew full well that at 
any moment an underwater explosion could rip their craft apart. Summarizing the 
remarkable success of these MSM crews Richard Schreadley noted that, “It took both 
raw courage and luck for the minesweeping effort to succeed as well as it did.”242     
 Shortly after Jewett assumed command a new type of mine was encountered 
along the Cua Viet River.  The first was discovered in March, and though their exact 
construction varied the new type was more difficult to detect than earlier versions.  One 
Clearwater message described two such devices, saying that, “both mines contained 
approximately 75 lbs. of plastic explosive in a wicker basket approximately 2 feet square 
and one feet deep.”243 Crudely constructed, these mines could be quickly assembled and 
then dropped in the river to drift with the prevailing tides and currents. Though far less 
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sophisticated than the larger influence mines employed in past months, the ‘basket 
mines’ would prove difficult to locate and destroy.244          
 The majority of the mines placed in the Cua Viet River were laid there at night.  
Consequently PBR night patrols were instituted to interdict this practice.  A dawn to 
dusk curfew had been in place on the northern rivers since the Tet Offensive, and any 
person or craft seen after sunset could be shot on sight.  By 1969 standard practice called 
for night patrols of two PBRs and a single LCPL.  The broad, stable design of the LCPL 
made it ideal for the installation of large equipment, and after being assigned to 
Clearwater the craft were equipped with a surveillance platform that consisted of a 24-
inch xenon infrared searchlight.  Six personnel manned the boats: two Marines trained in 
the use of the searchlights and a standard crew of four sailors.245 
 The trio of boats would extinguish all lights prior to getting underway and the 
LCPL embarked Marines would visually sweep the riverbanks for any sign of activity.  
When movement was spotted they would switch on their searchlights and engage the 
enemy.  On more than one occasion the patrol would encounter suspected North 
Vietnamese mine laying teams on the banks of the Cua Viet.  On the night of February 
11th one such patrol discovered a group of five suspected sappers carrying a large object 
on the north bank of the river.  When brought under rifle and grenade fire from the boats, 
the party quickly retreated.  Such an encounter would be typically followed at first light 
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by a detachment of Marines pursuing the suspected NVA soldiers in the hope of either 
discovering their location or gathering intelligence.246 
 Despite these efforts the underwater weapons exacted a considerable toll.  Five 
river craft were sunk or damaged by mines in 1969, including three PBRs.247 In one of 
these incidents a mine explosion lifted a PBR completely out of the water, yet amazingly 
no one onboard was injured and the boat received minor damage.248  Most encounters 
with the mines were not so forgiving, however, as twelve sailors were killed and over 
thirty wounded over the course of the year.249  Yet the task force also likely escaped 
more damage due to improved relations with South Vietnamese civilians.  In July a 
group of children discovered an unarmed pressure mine and turned it over to a passing 
PBR patrol.250  During the same month a large limpet mine was recovered in the fishing 
nets of a Vietnamese sampan, which was also quickly turned over by a passing patrol 
boat to an Explosive Ordnance Disposal team.251          
 North Vietnamese mines were not the only threat in I Corps.  The 1969 monsoon 
season was more intense than in years past, and on the morning of September 2nd 
Typhoon Doris came ashore near the DMZ.252 The high winds and heavy seas resulted in 
some significant damage to the Cua Viet base, including the destruction of a security 
tower and much of the perimeter fencing.253  With some irony, however, the PBRs of the 
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Dong Ha group fared better than those moored at Tan My due to the recent construction 
of a protective lagoon.  Fortunately most of the Clearwater’s river craft escaped 
undamaged, and within two days the task force resumed operations on both of the 
northern rivers.254 
 Duty with the Hue River Group in 1969 was a more laid back experience than its 
northwest counterpart.  Ironically the river that had sparked the creation of Task Force 
Clearwater had become all but devoid of enemy activity by the summer of 1968.  The 
Perfume River was continually swept for mines and the occasional firefight did take 
place between PBRs and Viet Cong, but logistics transits from Tan My to Hue went 
largely unopposed. The river group instead continued to focus on its psychological and 
MEDCAP operations, considered to be among the most successful of their kind in all of 
South Vietnam.255       
 In Brown Water, Black Berets Thomas Cutler offers perhaps the best analysis of 
Task Force Clearwater’s mission in 1969, summarizing it simply: “The enemy continued 
to mine, and Clearwater forces continued to sweep, patrol, and escort.”256  The North 
Vietnamese mining campaign of the Cua Viet is little remembered today, yet it was one 
of the most intensive efforts of the war to deny a line of communication to an enemy in 
modern times.  In the months that the enemy mining offensive on the Cua Viet 
intensified the mission of Task Force Clearwater always remained the same, to keep the 
rivers open and navigable.  Due to their efforts the rivers remained firmly under U.S. and 
ARVN control, and with the failure of the May 1968 offensive the NVA made no further 
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attempts to challenge them for control of I Corps.  As a consequence of the patrols by 
Clearwater and improved mine hunting efforts, the rivers were kept open.     
   
ACTOV and Mission’s End 
 A force in some ways even more powerful than the North Vietnamese military 
soon ended the U.S. Navy’s mission in I Corps.  The withdrawal of the American 
military presence from South Vietnam soon overtook Task Force Clearwater, as did the 
enormous effort to train the small navy of South Vietnam.  The latter effort had begun as 
far back as the summer of 1968, when the COMNAVFORV staff began drawing up 
plans for a potential turnover to the South Vietnamese.257  Subsequently in a tense 
meeting at MACV headquarters in Saigon on November 2nd, General Creighton Abrams 
forcefully informed his subordinates that the political situation in the United States 
demanded a strategy for rapid withdrawal. When an Air Force staff officer informed him 
of their plan to complete turnover to the South Vietnamese by 1976, Abrams stunned the 
crowded briefing room by angrily smashing his fist on the conference table.  After 
directing several choice expletives at the Air Force he denounced their timetable as 
completely unacceptable and declared that, “He [President Johnson] has no consensus of 
support for this war.  What support he has is dwindling.  It’s clear that the policy is to get 
us out of this war and turn it over to the Vietnamese.”258      
 Immediately after this exchange the new COMNAVFORV, Admiral Zumwalt, 
briefed General Abrams on his own withdrawal concept, and following its approval 
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proceeded to execute a remarkable campaign to both withdraw the U.S. Navy from 
South Vietnam and also to train and prepare the VNN (South Vietnamese Navy) to 
defend the rivers and coastlines.259  One of the most important factors in executing this 
program, soon designated Accelerated Turnover to the Vietnamese (ACTOV), was the 
admiral’s strong friendship with Commodore Tran Van Chon, his counterpart in the 
VNN. In letter dated April 1970 Zumwalt thanked Chon for the great progress in 
building up the VNN since the early months of 1969, of which he wrote “I attribute this 
almost entirely to your wonderful leadership, and I must confess that what you have 
done has exceeded what I had optimistically felt possible.”260   
 Without Chon’s assistance ACTOV would have been far more difficult to 
accomplish.  The program called for turning over virtually all of the U.S. Navy’s 
operational tasks in South Vietnam by June 30th, 1970.261  It involved two main phases 
and targeted the summer of 1972 as the date when the VNN would be materially and 
operationally capable of conducting naval operations without U.S. assistance.  Next to 
Operation SEALORDS, the ACTOV program was Admiral Zumwalt’s greatest 
accomplishment in South Vietnam.  Under enormous political pressure he managed to 
reach his goals in some ways even sooner than anticipated.  As one biographer of the 
admiral notes, “Zumwalt, though he did not yet know it, would make his name not so 
much on the Sea Lords strategy that bears his stamp, but on being the mind that 
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developed the best construct – the ‘winning’ idea – for disengaging the United States 
from its Vietnamese agony.”262   
 Throughout 1969 the training of the VNN sailors proceeded quickly, as did the 
turnover of brown water craft to newly designated units under South Vietnamese 
command.  The Mobile Riverine Force of the Mekong Delta was officially disbanded in 
August, as were the first river divisions of PBRs.263 One of the largest turnover 
ceremonies took place on October 10th, when eighty PBRs were ceremonially handed 
over to the VNN in Saigon.  At the close of the month thirteen PCF “Swift” boats of 
Operation Market Time were also added to the VNN inventory.264  Similar turnover 
ceremonies continued throughout the year, and by January 1970 the South Vietnamese 
Navy had increased from 8,000 to over 26,000 personnel.265 
 Despite the apparent success of ACTOV, the departure of U.S. forces from South 
Vietnam left some naval personnel bitter and discouraged.  Richard Schreadley, who 
served with Zumwalt in Saigon, doubted that the South Vietnamese could ever be truly 
successful in the independent defense of their country, and wrote painfully that, “In 
retrospect, many of us in Saigon were living in a dream world. Despite what some of us 
were seeing with our own eyes, we could not believe in our hearts that the tremendous 
investment America had made was being written off and that North Vietnam would be 
allowed to triumph.”266 Others veterans of the brown water fleet felt otherwise, including 
Thomas Cutler, who argued that ACTOV was perhaps politically rushed and never given 
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a fair test and that despite the changing politics the U.S. Navy-trained sailors of the VNN 
performed well during the 1972 Easter Offensive.267     
 Less than a month after his April 1970 letter to Commodore Chon, Admiral 
Zumwalt was relieved of command by Vice Admiral Jerome King at a large ceremony in 
Saigon harbor.268 Zumwalt, chosen over dozens of more senior admirals, was on his way 
to assume the Navy’s highest post, Chief of Naval Operations.  In his farewell speech he 
thanked Commodore Chon, the men and women under his command, and the people of 
South Vietnam.  Yet he saved his most heartfelt praise for the “sacrifices and heroism” 
of the brown water navy.  Halfway through his speech Zumwalt paid a brief tribute to 
the brown water sailors of I Corps, “As I look back over these 20 months, I see a map of 
South Vietnam with the Navy operating along the edges.  In the Cua Viet River just 
south of the DMZ, in the Naval Support Activity Danang – providing the sustenance to 
our Marine associates.”269  
 This task of the U.S. Navy providing logistical support along the rivers of I 
Corps would soon be a thing of the past.  The officers and men of Task Force 
Clearwater, separated geographically from the intensive ACTOV operations in IV 
Corps, played a far smaller role in training their VNN counterparts than those in the 
Mekong Delta.  However, after the November evacuation of most of the 3rd Marine 
Division from I Corps as part of Operation Keystone Cardinal, the need for the task 
force became far less apparent, and the task force was slated to disband in the summer of 
                                                267 Cutler, Brown Water, Black Berets, 358-59. 268 Admiral Zumwalt was relieved by Vice Admiral King on May 15th, 1970, onboard 
the USS Page County (LST-1076), in the Saigon Naval Shipyard.  269 R. L. Schreadley, From the Rivers to the Sea, 325.  
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1970.  Much of the evacuation of the Marines was accomplished under the watchful eye 
of the task force, and for much of October and November the harbor and logistics craft 
ferried the equipment and Marines themselves from Dong Ha to Danang.270    
 For the first half of 1970 much of Task Force Clearwater’s effort was directed at 
turning over its small fleet and meager resources to the VNN.  With the withdrawal of 
the majority of Army and Marine Corps personnel who once guarded the base, Cua Viet 
became all but a ghost town, reduced to an assortment of a few hundred personnel.  The 
headquarters of the task force was shifted to Mobile Base I at Tan My on February 14th, 
1970 and most of the patrol craft were soon turned over to the VNN.271  Mortar and 
rocket attacks became more and more infrequent, as the North Vietnamese patiently 
waited for the U.S. to withdraw.  On June 1st the boats and equipment slated for turnover 
were in Vietnamese hands, and exactly one month later the Stars and Stripes were hauled 
down for the final time at Tan My and replaced by the yellow and red flag of South 
Vietnam.  Twenty-eight months after its hasty inception, the task force had, 
“successfully completed its mission” in the congratulatory message from Admiral King. 
The United States Navy’s inland role in I Corps was over.272             
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Few wars have proven more contentious than the one the United States fought in 
Vietnam.  The bitterness of America’s failure in Southeast Asia lingers on, as do 
recriminations about alternatives to the strategies pursued by the United States during 
the long war.  Historians can only agree that many reasons are evident for the war’s 
outcome, including perhaps the most obvious, that the communist banner of national 
reunification proved more powerful than anything the United States or South Vietnam 
could provide.  Another commonly cited cause, the physical and political geography of 
Southeast Asia, has also been considered as a key factor.  The region’s dense jungles and 
long coastline encouraged a war of attrition and inhibited American air and naval power.  
The Ho Chi Minh Trail, the primary artery of land infiltration into South Vietnam, was 
another geographic advantage.  Concealed behind the western borders of Vietnam and 
largely invisible to attack from the air, this supply route proved to be one of the most 
insoluble problems for American war planners.  North Vietnam’s immunity from 
invasion, primarily due to its proximity to China, also proved of immense advantage to 
the communists.     
 Geography, however, did not always work to the communists’ benefit.  In I 
Corps the existence of navigable rivers proved enormously useful to the United States 
Navy.  The ability to transport large quantities of supplies by water from Danang and 
safely deliver them deep within partially occupied territory was of immense importance 
in holding the northern provinces.  In hindsight one of the most important decisions 
reached by the staff of Commander Naval Forces, Vietnam, in the first years of 
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Americanization was that to utilize both of the northern rivers as lines of supply and 
communication. This geographically favorable system of supply, more secure than roads 
or airfields, facilitated logistical support of the growing American military presence in I 
Corps.         
 The ability to resupply armies via inland waterways has long been recognized by 
theorists of war and strategy.  In his iconic treatise The Art of War. Antoine de Jomini 
discussed the obvious advantages of river supply, pointing out that, “Navigable streams 
and canals, when parallel to the line of operations of the army, render the transportation 
of supplies much easier, and also free the roads from the incumbrances of the numerous 
vehicles otherwise necessary.  For this reason, lines of operations thus situated are the 
most favorable.”273  These words echo the U.S. Navy’s brown water mission in I Corps 
with an almost prescient quality, as if the nineteenth-century Swiss master of strategy 
had foreseen the river war in Vietnam. 
 By even the most rigid standards the positive impact of the U.S. Navy’s inland 
operations in I Corps is difficult to deny.  During the 1968 Tet Offensive with its key 
battles of Hue and Khe Sanh a resistant line of supply proved to be critical to the 
American cause, and the final outcome of the campaign was in part due to the task 
force’s ability to maintain control of both rivers.  With some irony the mission for which 
Task Force Clearwater was originally created, ensuring the Perfume River supply line to 
Hue, became far less important after the recapture of the strategic city in early March.  
Narrow and isolated, the Cua Viet River came to consume more and more of the task 
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force’s resources, as well as to become the source of the largest proportion of its 
casualties.  Despite a two-year struggle by communist forces to deny the river to U.S. 
naval forces, the northernmost waterway in South Vietnam remained open and navigable 
throughout Clearwater’s existence.           
 The missions of the brown water navy in the northern and southern provinces of 
South Vietnam proved to be very different from each other.  The various Mekong Delta 
offensives such as SEALORDS were designed to fulfill the brown water navy’s original 
mission in Southeast Asia, limiting seaborne infiltration into South Vietnam. Operation 
Game Warden in particular was conceived of as a means to prevent the Viet Cong from 
moving supplies to their cadres throughout the Delta.  The mission of Clearwater 
contained a very different goal.  Instead of preventing infiltration, the task force was 
obligated to defend the river logistics craft so vital to its supply network along the inland 
waterways of South Vietnam. 
 While Clearwater’s operations during the Vietnam War confirm the critical 
importance of logistical supply in wartime, they also illustrate a troubling modern 
misperception.  During the 1991 Gulf War the United States demonstrated the ability to 
rapidly move enormous quantities of men and supplies to a distant battlefield.  Since 
then much of the American civilian population considers the supply of armies in the 
field a now routine practice.  Attacks on logistics convoys during the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan have not seriously altered the belief that the safe movement of the supplies 
that fuel armies is both simple and easy.  Few civilians are aware of the enormous effort 
required to transport the material necessary for modern war.  A generation ago supply by 
air was less reliable and more risky, and in Vietnam the lines of communications and 
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supply were far more contested and vulnerable than in recent wars.  This fact made the 
inland supply responsibility of Task Force Clearwater even more demonstrative of its 
overall importance.     
 Aside from its overall mission the task force had a number of unique qualities 
that set it apart from other brown water operations in Southeast Asia.  First, the northern 
task force was an improvised command, quickly established to ensure the safe passage 
of logistics traffic in a time of crisis.  In less than a week the task force went from 
nonexistent to one of the key factors in the U.S. Navy’s response to the Tet Offensive.  
Despite the short time between conception and the testing under heavy enemy pressure 
that heightened the learning curve its personnel made it perhaps the most successful of 
the inland naval operations of the war.  Although the SEALORDS task force proved to 
be well-organized and more successful than previous operations, preventing seaborne 
infiltration from Cambodia proved to be difficult to achieve even for a leader of Admiral 
Zumwalt’s talents.  Similarly the efforts of Operation Market Time failed to deliver truly 
decisive results.   
 The second significant difference was in size.  Throughout its existence 
Clearwater rarely operated more than twenty working patrol boats and a handful of 
minesweepers.  This was less than ten percent of the forces allocated to Operation Game 
Warden in the Mekong Delta, which at its peak operated more than two hundred PBRs.  
Despite repeated requests for additional craft, especially minesweepers, the phrase 
“operating on a shoestring” was very applicable.  However the task force’s contribution 
to the war effort was far out of proportion to its numbers.  Task Force Clearwater was in 
modern military parlance a force multiplier.  It was able to ensure both the resupply of 
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ground forces in I Corps and assist in preventing any incursion from the north.  Without 
positive control of both the Perfume and Cua Viet Rivers it would have been difficult, if 
not impossible for the U.S. military to maintain its grip on the northern provinces, 
especially during the critical year of 1968.  
 The final component of the task force’s unique contribution was in countermine 
warfare. Along with the Long Tau River that connects Saigon to the South China Sea, 
the Cua Viet River was the most heavily mined waterway in South Vietnam.  The threat 
to PBRs and logistics craft transiting to Dong Ha was a never ending one, and demanded 
courage, determination, and innovation.  Despite the vast array of mines employed by 
the Viet Cong the effort to shut down the Cua Viet was defeated, and through this effort 
the Navy gained a wealth of experience in mine warfare.  Regretfully, however, this 
knowledge—purchased at a high price—was soon forgotten.  Mine warfare languished 
in the fleet during ensuing decades, with painful and deadly consequences.  Naval 
historian Edward Marolda argued that overconfidence fueled this trend, and noted that, 
“With a small fleet of 1950’s-built ocean minesweepers and minesweeping helicopters in 
the Navy inventory, the United States was not prepared to deal with the hundreds of sea 
mines that the Iranians dropped into the gulf during the Iran-Iraq War.” Mine damage to 
several major warships during the 1991 Gulf War also demonstrated the Navy’s failure 
to capitalize on its mine warfare experience in Vietnam.274          
 Less than six months after the turnover of naval assets to the VNN began, the 
final PBR was officially handed over to the Vietnamese Navy in a ceremony in Saigon, 
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ending the four-year role of American inland sea power in Southeast Asia.275  The 
turnover symbolized far more than the ownership of a few patrol boats, however.  In 
many ways it represented a return to form for the U.S. Navy in its abandonment of 
brown water operations.  Devoid of an obvious mission during the Cold War 
confrontation with the expanding Soviet Navy during the 1970s and ‘80s, the U.S. 
brown water navy all but disappeared.  
 Emphasizing ships and technologies that could challenge the Soviet fleet, priority 
was placed on radar technicians and nuclear engineers, not patrol boat gunners.  As an 
example in 1972 Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, the powerful and politically savvy head 
of the Navy’s nuclear propulsion program, declared before Congress that he was facing a 
shortfall in trained nuclear engineering personnel, and pressed for more funds to keep 
their valuable skills in the service.276  Nuclear-powered cruisers, submarines and aircraft 
carriers were the future, and as the fleet moved past its trying experience in Vietnam 
American naval planners wanted little to do with the river war in Southeast Asia.  The 
last remaining naval personnel left South Vietnam in the spring of 1973, and on March 
29th Naval Forces Vietnam was officially disbanded.277 
 The boats and places left behind by Task Force Clearwater did not fare well.  
Less than a year after the July 1970 turnover of its in-country assets to the Vietnamese 
Navy, the enemy mining campaign along the Cua Viet River had become a worsening 
problem, the during the month of May 1971 seventeen mine incidents occurred on the 
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river.  The VNN proved unable or unwilling to combat the mines as effectively as their 
advisers had done.  The Cua Viet base itself was overrun by North Vietnamese soldiers 
in their 1972 Easter Offensive, with many of the American-trained VNN sailors fighting 
hard until being killed or captured. Though I Corps was largely retaken by U.S. and 
ARVN forces the failed NVA offensive signaled what was to come three short years 
later.278          
 Even before the fall of Saigon the brown water mission seemed to have little 
future in the U.S. Navy.  Admiral Zumwalt, its most gifted champion, retired after 
completing his tour as Chief of Naval Operations in 1974.  Most of the brown water 
sailors in the fleet returned to duty onboard cruisers or destroyers, and over time the 
brown water navy of Vietnam developed an almost mythical quality.  On the concluding 
pages of Richard Schreadley’s study, the former naval officer describes a post-war trip 
to Vietnam.  Bitter and nostalgic, he looked eagerly for any sign of his beloved brown 
water fleet, but encountered only a ghostly presence of the boats and men he once knew, 
and concludes that, “The Great Green Fleet of the Delta, the brave PBRs, the Swift 
boats, and the Brown Water Sailor himself all belong to the past.  Only the rivers and the 
memories remain.”279  
 Few remnants of the American river campaigns in Southeast Asia exist today.  
Of Task Force Clearwater very little can be found. The base at Tan My is long gone, and 
to the north a lighthouse now occupies the beach where the Cua Viet base once stood. 
Nearby a recently constructed bridge at the river’s mouth connects the banks of the once 
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treacherous waterway. Danang, a bustling financial and industrial center, is more known 
as a hub for tourism than as the burgeoning former logistics terminus for the U.S Navy.  
Yet in many ways the brown water navy of Vietnam has lived on.  Changing threats and 
tactics prompted the U.S. Navy to reevaluate its brown water capabilities after the war.  
Control of the shallow waters surrounding land, the littorals, was a buzzword on every 
sailor’s lips by the early 1990’s.  The attack on the USS Cole in October 2000 
galvanized the U.S. Navy’s blue water strategists into providing brown water craft for 
harbor patrol and defense. 
 Today the brown water sailors of Vietnam are represented by the Riverine Group 
of Naval Expeditionary Combat Command, which was established in 2006.  Combining 
elements of both Operation Game Warden and the Mobile Riverine Force, its men and 
vessels are tasked with, “protecting and maintaining brown water environments and 
destroying hostile forces.”  Equipped with sophisticated boats of considerable 
technology and firepower, the three squadrons of the Riverine Group soon proved their 
worth in Iraq, patrolling the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers and maintaining a strong 
presence at the Haditha Dam, the primary water source for Baghdad and much of central 
Iraq.  Modern capabilities such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) add considerably 
to Riverine Group’s ability to sweep the rivers free of opposing forces on both the land 
and water. Like Task Force Clearwater these modern brown water squadrons enabled the 
safe passage of men and material down the ancient waterways and contributed to the 
success of the famous Iraq War “surge” of American military personnel in 2007-2008.280   
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 The brown water mission is one that has proven both important but transitory in 
the history of the U.S. Navy, rising and falling according to the maritime and strategic 
needs of the time.  During the Vietnam War it played a vital but often overlooked role, 
and of the major brown water task forces Clearwater has been the least remembered.  
Yet this river force played a key role far out of proportion to its size and place in 
historical memory. Far from a footnote to history, the men and boats of this small brown 
water fleet are inseparable parts of America’s searing experience in Vietnam.      
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APPENDIX A 
KEY ACRONYMS 
ACTOV  Accelerated Turnover to the Vietnamese 
ARVN   Army of the Republic of Vietnam 
ASPB   Assault Support Patrol Boat 
ATC   Armored Troop Carrier 
ATSB   Advanced Tactical Support Base 
CINCPAC   Commander in Chief, Pacific 
COMNAVFORV Commander Naval Forces, Vietnam 
COMUSMACV Commander US Military Assistance Command Vietnam 
CNO   Chief of Naval Operations 
CTG   Commander Task Group 
CTZ   Corps Tactical Zone 
DMZ   Demilitarized Zone 
DRV (DRVN)  Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) 
EOD   Explosive Ordnance Disposal 
JCS   Joint Chiefs of Staff 
LCM   Landing Craft, Medium 
LCPL   Landing Craft, Personnel (Large) 
LCU   Landing Craft, Utility 
LSD   Landing Ship, Dock 
LSM   Landing Ship, Medium 
LST    Landing Ship, Tank 
MAAG  Military Assistance Advisory Group 
MACV  Military Assistance Command, Vietnam 
MAF   Marine Amphibious Force 
MEDCAP  Medical Civic Action Program 
MRF   Mobile Riverine Force  
NATO   North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NLF   National Liberation Front 
NVA   North Vietnamese Army 
PACV   Patrol Air Cushion Vehicle 
PBR   Patrol Boat, River 
PCF   Patrol Craft, Fast 
PRG   Provisional Revolutionary Government 
RVN   Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) 
SEALORDS  Southeast Asia Lake, Ocean, River, Delta Strategy 
TFCW   Task Force Clearwater 
VC   Viet Cong 
VNN    Vietnamese Navy (South) 
VNMC  Vietnamese Marine Corps 
YFU   Harbor Utility Craft 
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APPENDIX B 
 
CHRONOLOGY 
 
1964 
 January    Bucklew Report released 
 August    Gulf of Tonkin Incident 
 
1965      
 March    Operation Market Time established 
 October 15th   NSA Danang established 
      
1966 
 April 1    COMNAVFORV established    
 December   Operation Game Warden established 
  
1967  
 June    Mobile Riverine Force established 
 September   Operation Green Wave 
 
1968 
 January 9   I CTZ River Patrol Group established 
 January 21   Siege of Khe Sanh begins 
 January 30/31   Tet Offensive Begins 
 February 24   Task Force Clearwater established 
 February 29   Dong Ha/Hue River Patrol Groups established 
     TFCW headquarters moved to NSA Cua Viet 
 March 2   Hue officially recaptured by US/ARVN forces 
 March 10   Worst artillery bombardment of NSA Cua Viet 
 April 8    Siege of Khe Sanh lifted 
 April 30-May 30  Battle of Dai Do/May Offensive 
 September 30   Rear Admiral Kenneth Veth relieved by Vice 
     Admiral Elmo Zumwalt 
 November   Operations SEALORDS begins 
 December   ACTOV program begun 
 
1969 
 August    Mobile Riverine Force disbanded 
 November   3rd Marine Division evacuated from I Corps 
    
1970  
 February   Task Force Clearwater headquarters shifted to 
     Mobile Base I at Tan My 
 July 1st   Task Force Clearwater officially disestablished 
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 May    Admiral Zumwalt relieved as COMNAVFORV 
 
1972 
 April    North Vietnamese Easter Offensive 
 
1973 
 January   Paris Peace Accords signed 
 March    COMNAVFORV disbanded 
 
1975 
 April    Saigon falls to North Vietnam Army  
     Operation Frequent Wind, U.S. Navy evacuation of 
     South Vietnam 
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